Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Engineering Management & Systems
Engineering Theses & Dissertations

Engineering Management & Systems
Engineering

Fall 2017

Emergency Diesel-Electric Generator Set Maintenance and Test
Periodicity
Stephen John Fehr
Old Dominion University, sfehr@odu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/emse_etds
Part of the Operational Research Commons, and the Statistics and Probability Commons

Recommended Citation
Fehr, Stephen J.. "Emergency Diesel-Electric Generator Set Maintenance and Test Periodicity" (2017).
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Dissertation, Engineering Management & Systems Engineering, Old Dominion
University, DOI: 10.25777/q2nk-n411
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/emse_etds/24

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Engineering Management & Systems
Engineering at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Engineering Management & Systems
Engineering Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

EMERGENCY DIESEL-ELECTRIC GENERATOR SET
MAINTENANCE AND TEST PERIODICITY
by
Stephen John Fehr
M.S. December 2014, Old Dominion University
B.S. December 1997, Pennsylvania State University
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
November 2017

Approved by:
T. Steven Cotter (Director)
Holly Handley (Member)
Jennifer Michaeli (Member)
Cesar Pinto (Member)
Resit Unal (Member)

ABSTRACT
EMERGENCY DIESEL-ELECTRIC GENERATOR SET
MAINTENANCE AND TEST PERIODICITY
Stephen John Fehr
Old Dominion University, 2017
Director: Dr. T. Steven Cotter

Manufacturer and industry recommendations vary considerably for maintenance and tests
of emergency diesel-electric generator sets in emergency standby duty. There is little consistency
among generator sets of similar technology, and manufacturers and their representatives often
provide contradictory guidance. As a result, periodicity of emergency diesel-electric generator
set maintenance and tests varies considerably in practice. Utilizing the framework proposed and
tested by Fehr (2014), this research developed a parametric regression survival model of the
reliability of modern diesel-electric generator sets in emergency standby duty as a function of
maintenance, age, and cumulative run hours. A survival regression technique leveraging Cox’s
(1972) methods was developed to combine multiple exponential and Weibull (1951)
distributions into a single model to represent emergency diesel-electric generator sets and other
complex machinery exhibiting multiple independent failure distributions. A generalized model
and reliability tables derived from that model are presented along with maintenance and test
recommendations to assist managers in determining the optimal maintenance program for a
diesel-electric generator set.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Emergency power systems based on packaged emergency diesel-electric generator sets,
referred to herein as generator sets, are installed at facilities where a loss of utility power would
result in an unacceptable impact to operational capability or present a risk to life or safety. These
generator sets are typically configured to start automatically upon electrical utility failure and
assume essential facility loads until utility power was restored. Although emergency generator
sets in areas with exceptionally poor quality electrical utility power may run 200 hours or more
per year, emergency generator sets in areas with very stable utility power may not run
operationally at all in a given year. This represents a significant departure from continuous duty
applications for which the diesel engines in these generator sets were typically designed. Such
structural variability in operational demand also creates challenges in determining optimal
maintenance and test periodicity of critical equipment with high reliability requirements.
Maintenance and test recommendations National in Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
publications NFPA 70B (2016) and NFPA 110 (2016) represent the standard for power
component and emergency diesel-electric generator set maintenance. These document series
were referenced by Department of Defense guidance in Joint Departments of the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force Technical Manual TM 5-683 (1995) Facilities Engineering Electrical
Interior Facilities and by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) commercial
recommendations (IEEE 3007.2-2010). These documents also included non-specific statements
to follow manufacturer recommendations. Standards for recommended preventative maintenance
have changed little in past revisions of NFPA 70B and NFPA 110 and are largely based on
studies conducted on diesel-electric generator sets in use between 1971 and 1998 (Hale & Arno,
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2009; IEEE 493-2007). However, in practice, recommendations for periodicity of maintenance
and testing of emergency diesel generator systems differ significantly between organizations,
publications, and manufacturers of similar technology systems. Recommendations have even
varied between individual manufacturer representatives and publications for a specific model
generator set. While manufacturers are often the most knowledgeable about the design of their
own equipment, manufacturers’ abilities to conduct robust long-term failure modes and effects
analyses on fielded units have been limited, and manufacturer maintenance recommendations
have often been highly speculative (Moubray, 1997). The result has been inconsistent
maintenance and test practices on similar systems. This inconsistency provided an opportunity to
quantitatively determine the empirical impact of historic maintenance practices on emergency
diesel-electric generator system reliability.

PURPOSE
The purpose of this research was to develop a general model for determining the
reliability and optimal test and maintenance periodicities for emergency diesel-electric generator
sets supporting critical operations facilities and other facilities requiring highly reliable
emergency power. Per NFPA 70 (2017), critical operations power systems facilities encompass
Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense command, control and
communication centers, as well as hospitals, police stations, and fire stations. These facilities
required the highest levels of readiness, with expectations of one hundred percent mission
availability driving power availability requirements in excess of 99.9999% (JIE Operations
Sponsor Group, 2014). Such high availability requirements push the limit of what is possible
with current technology, even with redundancy and near-elimination of single points of failure.
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The emergency power systems that support these facilities have to maintain the highest levels of
reliability and availability to meet mission availability requirements while still minimizing
unnecessary costs.
This research and the new modeling methods developed for it were intended to provide
managers the qualitative data needed to confidently optimize the staffing level, and generator set
maintenance plan for each facility. This research was intended to also allow managers to more
accurately calculate power system reliability as a function of not only design, but also
maintenance. This would give managers flexibility to consider installation design with long-term
maintenance plans to achieve reliability goals.
This research was supported by the United States Navy in close cooperation with Old
Dominion University. This research was intended to guide future policy for test and maintenance
periodicity for United States Navy emergency diesel-electric generator systems and to permit the
update of maintenance practices in NFPA 110 (2016) and engineering data in TM 5-968-5
(2006), NFPA 70B (2016), and IEEE 493-2007 (2007). The views expressed herein do not
necessarily represent the views of the United States Navy or Old Dominion University.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
This research sought to produce new knowledge to answer a series of questions defining
the relationship between emergency diesel-electric generator set maintenance, tests, and other
properties that may impact reliability. These relationships were modeled mathematically in
regression Equation 1, with a descriptive list of database and regression variables in Table 1. As
the high reliability of emergency diesel-electric generator sets resulted in a low-occurrence rate
of failure events, even with large quantities of data (TM 5-968-5, 2006), high confidence
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intervals would result in a high risk of Type II errors rejecting valid predictors. Therefore, a
significance level of α ≤ 0.10 was chosen for a confidence interval of 90% for hypothesis testing.
The associated risk of Type I errors was considered when analyzing and interpreting results.

log ℎ({𝑡, 𝑛𝑠 , 𝑇𝑟𝑡 }|𝑥𝑖 )
22

21

22

= log(ℎ0 ({𝑡, 𝑛𝑠 , 𝑇𝑟𝑡 })) + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑗
𝑖=1

𝑖=1 𝑗=𝑖+1

(1)
22

+ ∑ 𝛽𝑏𝑖 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑏𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒 + 𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽𝑘𝑊 𝑘𝑊
𝑖=1

+ 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒 log(𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒 ) + 𝛽𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑣 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑣 ) + 𝛽𝐿 𝑥𝐿 + 𝛽𝑠𝑟𝑐 𝑥𝑠𝑟𝑐 + 𝜀

Primary research question: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric
generator set reliability and maintenance, test periodicity, training, make, model, size,
age, run time, and load?
Null Hypothesis Ho0: Maintenance periodicity, test periodicity, training, make, model,
size, age, run time, and load have no impact on generator set reliability.
Ho0: β1=β2=… β22=β0,1=β0,2=…β21,22=βmake=βmodel=βkW=βage=βrtfv=βL=0, α ≤ 0.10
Alternate Hypothesis Ha0: At least one predictor has an impact on generator set
reliability.
Ha0: At least one β  0, α ≤ 0.10
The case for rejection of Ho in favor of Ha indicates that survival regression models can
be applied toward the development of optimal test and maintenance policies for critical
equipment operated under high reliability requirements.
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Research sub-question 1: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric
generator set maintenance periodicity and reliability?
Null Hypothesis Ho1: Maintenance periodicity has no impact on emergency diesel-electric
generator set reliability.
Ho1: β1=β2=β3=…= β18=0, α ≤ 0.10
Hypothesis Ha1: Maintenance periodicity has a significant impact on emergency dieselelectric generator set reliability.
Ha1: βi ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10, for any value, i = 1 to 18

Research sub-question 2: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric
generator set test periodicity and reliability?
Null Hypothesis Ho2: Test periodicity has no impact on generator set reliability.
Ho2: β18=β19=β20=β21=0, α ≤ 0.10
Hypothesis Ha2: Test periodicity has a significant impact on emergency diesel-electric
generator set reliability.
Ha2: βi ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10, for any value, i = 19 to 22

Research sub-question 3: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric
generator set size and reliability?
Null Hypothesis Ho3: Size has no impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set
reliability.
Ho3: βkW = 0, α ≤ 0.10
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Hypothesis H a3: Size has a significant impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set
reliability.
Ha3: βkW ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10

Research sub-question 4: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric
generator set age and reliability?
Null Hypothesis Ho4: Age has no impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set
reliability.
Ho4: βage = 0, α ≤ 0.10
Hypothesis H a5: Age has a significant impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set
reliability.
Ha4: βage ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10

Research sub-question 5: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric
generator set cumulative chronometer run-time and reliability?
Null Hypothesis Ho5: Cumulative chronometer run-time has no impact on emergency
diesel-electric generator set reliability.
Ho5: βrtfv = 0, α ≤ 0.10
Hypothesis Ha5: Cumulative chronometer run-time has a significant impact on emergency
diesel-electric generator set reliability.
Ha5: βrtfv ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10
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Research sub-question 6: What is the relationship between emergency diesel-electric
generator set load and reliability?
Null Hypothesis Ho6: Load has no impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set
reliability.
Ho6: βL = 0, α ≤ 0.10
Hypothesis Ha6: Load has a significant impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set
reliability.
Ha6: βL ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10

Research sub-question 7: What is the relationship between the training of service
personnel and emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability?
Null Hypothesis Ho7: Training of servicing personnel has no impact on emergency dieselelectric generator set reliability.
Ho7: βb1=βb2=…=βb22=0, α ≤ 0.10
Hypothesis Ha7: Training of service personnel has a significant impact on emergency
diesel-electric generator set reliability.
Ha7: βbi ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10, for any value, i = 1 to 22

Research sub-question 8: What is the relationship between the make and model of
emergency diesel-electric generator set and emergency diesel-electric generator set
reliability?
Null Hypothesis Ho8: Make and model have no impact on emergency diesel-electric
generator set reliability.
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Ho8: βmake=βmodel=0, α ≤ 0.10
Hypothesis Ha8: Make and/or model have a significant impact on emergency dieselelectric generator set reliability.
Ha8: βmake ≠ 0 or βmodel ≠ 0, α ≤ 0.10

Table 1. Table of Predictor, Data and Variable Descriptions
Symbol
ID
FID
Date
Name
Make
Model
kW
kVA
ns
Install_Date
Ts
Te
Trts
Trte
Trt
Fs
Fr
Fst
Frt
Fso
Fro
Tfv
Tage
Trtfv
Tttrv
Fsv
Frv
Ftv
Fov
Fv

Description
Unique record identification number for each generator set rational subgroup
Failure ID, unique within each generator set rational subgroup (ID.FID)
Date the record was recorded in the survey format
The assigned name or designation of a particular generator set
Generator set manufacturer
Generator set model
Generator full load rating, in electrical kilowatts (ekW)
Generator full load rating, in kilovolt-amps
Number of generator starts in the reporting period
Installation date (calendar), the date the generator set was installed
Start date (calendar), date of the start of the reporting period
End date (calendar)
Run-time start (hours), generator set chronometer (run-hours) at the start of the
reporting period
Run-time end (hours), generator set chronometer (run-hours) at the end of the
reporting period
Total run-time (hours), total run-hours in the reporting period
Total failures to start in the reporting period
Total failures while running in the reporting period
Number of failures to start during testing
Number of failures while running during testing
Number of operational failures to start
Number of operational failures while running
Failure date (calendar), the date the failure event was observed
Age (yrs), the generator set age at the failure event
Run hours at failure (hrs), the chronometer (run-hours) at the failure event
Time to repair (hrs) for this failure event
Failure to start (Boolean), for this failure event
Failure while running (Boolean), for this failure event
Failure during testing (Boolean), for this failure event
Failure during operation (Boolean), for this failure event
Any failure (Boolean), for this failure event; Fv=Ftv+Fov
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Table 1. Continued
Symbol
xL
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7
x8
x9
x10
x11
x12
x13
x14
x15
x16
x17
x18
x19
x20
x21
x22
xb1
xb2
xb3
xb4
xb5
xb6
xb7
xb8
xb9
xb10
xb11
xb12
xb13
xb14
xb15
xb16
xb17
xb18
xb19
xb20

Description
Typical load, as percent of generator full load kW rating
Maintenance periodicity (hrs.), contractor service visit; details not known
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check alarms
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check switch & breaker positions
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), visual inspection for leaking fluids
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), visual inspection of hoses, cables, etc.
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check fuel level
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check oil level
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check coolant level
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check air filter
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), battery voltage & physical condition
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check fan belt(s)
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), battery resistance or impedance test
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), clean unit exterior (including radiator & louvers)
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), fuel cleaning (or fluid analysis)
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), oil change (or fluid analysis)
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), check electrical tightness
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), engine intensive maintenance
Maintenance periodicity (yrs.), generator (electrical) intensive maintenance
Test periodicity (yrs.), generator set no-load test
Test periodicity (yrs.), generator set load test on load bank
Test periodicity (yrs.), generator set load test on operational load
Test periodicity (yrs.), generator set dead-bus test on operational load
Servicing personnel training (factor), contractor service visit; details not known

Check alarms
Servicing personnel training (factor), check switch & breaker positions
Servicing personnel training (factor), visual inspection for leaking fluids
Servicing personnel training (factor), visual inspection of hoses, cables, etc.
Servicing personnel training (factor), check fuel level
Servicing personnel training (factor), check oil level
Servicing personnel training (factor), check coolant level
Servicing personnel training (factor), check air filter
Servicing personnel training (factor), battery voltage & physical condition
Servicing personnel training (factor), check fan belt(s)
Servicing personnel training (factor), battery resistance or impedance test
Servicing personnel training (factor), clean unit exterior (including radiator &
louvers)
Servicing personnel training (factor), fuel cleaning (or fluid analysis)
Servicing personnel training (factor), oil change (or fluid analysis)
Servicing personnel training (factor), check electrical tightness
Servicing personnel training (factor), engine intensive maintenance
Servicing personnel training (factor), generator (electrical) intensive maintenance
Servicing personnel training (factor), generator set no-load test
Servicing personnel training (factor), generator set load test on load bank
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Table 1. Continued
Symbol Description
xb21
Servicing personnel training (factor), generator set load test on operational load
xb22
Servicing personnel training (factor), generator set dead-bus test

SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The types of emergency diesel-electric generator sets investigated in this research were
packaged diesel-electric generator sets with the following characteristics:
•

turbocharged fuel-injected diesel piston engine prime-mover;

•

operating speed of 1500 or 1800 revolutions per minute;

•

direct coupled to an alternating current brushless three-phase electrical generator
with 120Y/208, 230Y/400 or 277Y/480 volt output at 50 or 60 Hertz;

•

a low-voltage electric starting system with lead-acid batteries operating at
between 12V-48V;

•

an air-to-water/glycol radiator-based cooling system; and

•

a diesel fuel oil system.

The focus of this research was on high-efficiency low-emission units of these
characteristics between 60kW and 2.5MW electrical capacity that have been installed in the past
twenty years at critical operations power facilities and that run fewer than two hundred hours per
year. These generator sets generally include optional components to increase reliability such as
jacket water heaters, strip heaters and dual electric starters. A photograph of a pair of typical
generator sets included in this research is shown in Figure 1. The process flow for emergency
power system reliability is shown in Figure 2. Some generator sets that differed in some way but
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were still appropriate to include, such as diesel engines featuring pneumatic start, or engines with
diesel blocks adapted to natural gas, were included when data was available.

Figure 1. Typical packaged emergency diesel-electric generator sets.

Although electronic control systems and automatic transfer switches play an important
role in overall emergency power system performance, NFPA 70B (2016) maintenance
periodicity recommendations exceed one year for most preventative maintenance actions, and
detailed maintenance records are rarely kept for this equipment. The combination of longinterval maintenance and lack of records would make application of the Fehr (2014) framework
difficult for this equipment. However, the primary serviceable components comprising these
systems, batteries and breakers, are used in other applications for which reliability-centered
maintenance failure modes and effects analysis can be performed. Many control system
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components have no applicable preventative maintenance beyond cleaning. The characteristics
of preventative maintenance and primary failure modes of controls and automatic transfer
switches are beyond the scope of this research and are not considered herein.

System Design
Sustainment

Quality

Personnel

Redundancy

Training
Funding

Maintenance
Preventative
Maintenance
Corrective
Maintenance

Tests
Routine Tests
Special Tests

Figure 2. Emergency generator system reliability process flow.

MAINTENANCE
Maintenance represents a combination of preventative maintenance and corrective
maintenance. Preventative maintenance is performed at regular intervals and is intended to
reduce the failure rate. Corrective maintenance is not performed at regular intervals and involves
repairs that are discovered and corrected before resulting in an operational failure. A typical
preventative maintenance plan includes very simple items at frequent intervals, such as visual
inspections to ensure vents and louvers are not blocked, with more intensive items at longer
intervals, such as replacing piston liners and main crankcase bearings. In some context,
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maintenance includes routine testing as well. This study focuses on routine preventative
maintenance actions recommended by NFPA 110 (2016) with intervals of a year or less, as
shown in Appendix D.

TESTS
Routine tests of emergency diesel-electric generator sets are categorized in this research
as one of four general tests, which will be referred to as no-load tests, load bank tests, operational
load tests, and dead-bus tests (Fehr, 2014).

NO-LOAD TESTS
No-load tests of emergency diesel-electric generator sets involve starting the generator
set, allowing it to run at idle for a short period, typically between 15 and 60 minutes, and then
turning it off. This tests the starting system, engine, and some aspects of the control system, but
this does not place the engine under load and does not test the transfer switch. No-load tests
represents low-risk to the operator because a test failure has little direct impact on ongoing
operations of the facility. This test is often run at weekly or biweekly intervals, but running a
diesel engine at low loads and low operational temperatures can cause unburned diesel fuel to
build up in the exhaust stack, high moisture content in the lubricating oil, and other unwanted
conditions (Loehlein, 2007; Tufte, 2014). While some maintenance manuals recommend no-load
tests as part of routine maintenance (Caterpillar, 1997; Caterpillar, 2010a; Caterpillar, 2010b;
Caterpillar, 2010c; Caterpillar, 2010d), and use of weekly exercisers is commonly used to
automatically run no-load tests at many facilities, other maintenance manuals and many
technicians recommend against it, believing it does more harm than good (Loehlein, 2007).
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LOAD-BANK TESTS
Load-bank tests of emergency diesel-electric generator sets involve starting the generator
set and using a load bank to simulate station loads. This provides a more thorough operational
test than a no-load test with a similarly low level of risk but does not exercise or test the transfer
switch. Use of a load bank is often the most practical way to test a generator set to full rated
operational load. While most load banks are purely resistive, reactive load banks can simulate the
power factor of many inductive or capacitive loads. NFPA 110 (2016) recommends performing a
stepped load-bank test to 100% of rated capacity at system commissioning and following
intensive maintenance, but NFPA 110 only recommends routine load-bank testing if site
operational loads are low. For sites with low operational loads, a load bank permits testing of the
site power equipment at higher loads than would normally be possible.

OPERATIONAL LOAD TESTS
Operational load tests of emergency diesel-electric generator sets involve starting the
generator set and transferring the facility load to the generator system. This test is frequently
accomplished by momentarily paralleling the generator sets with utility power to avoid a break in
facility power or by synchronizing the generator phase angle to match utility power and then
performing an open-transition transfer with an interruption of power lasting no more than 100
milliseconds. A monthly load test including the exercising of automatic transfer switchgear is
legally required by NFPA 110 (2016) for generator sets in some applications including lifesafety and for Department of Defense generator sets by Joint Departments of the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force Technical Manual TM 5-683 (1995).
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DEAD-BUS TESTS
A dead-bus test involves simulating a utility failure and is the most comprehensive and
operationally realistic generator test. This test, by its nature, requires a momentary break in
facility power and increases the risk of an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) failure causing an
uninterruptible critical power outage. It also results in nuisance outages to equipment not
supplied with uninterruptible critical power. The generator system experiences the full in-rush
and magnetization currents of station loads during a dead bus test, so this test can reveal
problems not apparent during paralleled transfer or open-transition synchronized operational load
tests.

GENERATOR SET RATINGS
ISO 8528-1 (2005) defines generator set duty ratings by four categories. Emergency
standby rated generator sets are capable of delivering up to 200 hours of operation per year at an
average of up to 70% of the generator set rating over any 24 hour period. Limited-time running
rated generator sets are capable of delivering up to 500 hours of operation per year at 100% of
the generator set rating. Prime rated generator sets are capable of unlimited annual running time
at an average of up to 70% of the generator set rating over any 24 hour period. Continuous rated
generator sets are capable of unlimited annual running time at 100% of the generator set rating.
Although prime and continuous rated generators are not restricted in annual run time by the
manufacturers, they cannot be run continuously in practice due to maintenance requirements that
require shut-down to perform. The type of generator sets included in this research are not
typically used in prime or continuous power applications, as they are not typically economical in
those applications, but prime or continuous rated 1500-1800rpm generator sets are often selected
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for emergency standby use if there is risk that extended utility power outages might occur that
could require generator sets to operate for more than 200 hours in one year.
It is common practice for manufacturers to dual-rate a diesel-electric generator set model
at one capacity rating for standby duty and at a 10% lower kW rating for prime duty. For
example, a generator set might be rated 1.2MW for prime duty and 1.32MW for standby duty
and may even have both ratings listed on the nameplate. Generator sets are sized at some sites by
their prime rating to allow an emergency plant to operate for extended periods of utility outage
without violating manufacturer ratings but, in all other respects, perform as an emergency
standby generator set. The Fehr (2014) framework considered prime rated generators running in
emergency standby duty as if they were emergency standby generators and does not differentiate
between these two ratings. This research included standby, prime and continuous rated generator
sets but was delimited exclusive to those generator sets that operate normally in emergency
standby duty and have not exceeded 200 hours of operation in any one year since installation.
Another common practice among generator manufacturers is to de-rate one model and
sell it as a lower-rated model. For example, an 800kW generator set may also be sold as a
650kW generator set for marketing and price stratification purposes with only minor differences
in programming and construction between the 650kW and 800kW models. The Fehr (2014)
framework did not differentiate based on the potential capacity of various frame sizes and treated
each generator set by its reported nameplate rating. The Fehr (2014) framework was structured to
detect statistically significant differences in performance between different generator makes and
models, although it cannot discern between manufacturing tolerances and design or material
changes made during a production run of a particular model series.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Despite the ubiquity of emergency diesel-electric generator sets in commercial and
industrial facilities, there has been very little published research on the impact of maintenance
and tests on the reliability of diesel-electric generator sets manufactured in the last twenty years.
Hale and Arno (2009) indicated maintenance quality level was influenced equipment availability
in previous studies, but viewed it as a source of potential bias and but those studies did not
attempt to quantify equipment reliability or availability as a function of maintenance quality. In
the generator reliability studies Hale and Arno (2009) performed in the 1990s, they carefully
chose diversified data sets to reduce the potential of bias from maintenance quality.
Although there is some published research on older diesel-electric generator sets in
service during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, stringent emissions and environmental restrictions in
the United States and Europe have driven design changes in the diesel engines powering
emergency diesel-electric generator sets produced since the early 1990s when the Euro and Tier
emissions standards came into effect in Europe and the United States. Design changes in these
modern diesel engines include increased fuel injection pressures, retarded injection timing,
exhaust gas recirculation, higher peak combustion pressures, and articulated pistons with steel
crowns and high top rings (Margaroni, 1999; Walbolt, 2010), as well as sophisticated emissions
monitoring systems and digital controls. Advances in metallurgical techniques, emissions
reduction techniques, and component designs continue to improve performance (Walbolt, 2010).
Changes since the 1990s are known to impact the life of lubrication oils (Margaroni, 1999), but
impact of this and other changes with respect to reliability as a function of maintenance and
testing of units in emergency standby duty is not yet well known.
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NFPA 70B (2016) and NFPA 110 (2016) recommendations represent the standard for
power component and emergency diesel-electric generator set maintenance and are referenced by
Department of Defense guidance (TM 5-683, 1995) and IEEE publications (IEEE 3007.2-2010),
along with recommendations to follow manufacturer recommendations. The commercial
standards for recommended preventative maintenance have changed little in past revisions of
NFPA 70B and NFPA 110 and are largely based on studies conducted on diesel-electric
generator sets in use between 1971 and 1998 (Hale & Arno, 2009; IEEE 493-2007).
Manufacturers of large emergency diesel-electric generator sets include Caterpillar,
Cummins Power Generation, Generac Power Systems, Detroit Diesel/MTU Friedrichshafen,
Volvo-Penta, SDMO, and Kohler. Some of these manufacturers directly reference NFPA 110 for
recommended maintenance and tests, but others have model-specific maintenance and test
recommendations. These engines have a lot of similarity of design and often include components
manufactured by the same suppliers as their competitors (Walbolt, 2010), and it’s possible to
find major components such as entire engines in generator sets of different manufacturers.
General recommendations published by Caterpillar (SEBU6042-04, 1997) closely match
most of the maintenance recommendations of NFPA 110 (2016) including weekly inspection,
weekly fluid checks, and additional maintenance at one-year and three-year intervals. While
NFPA 110 (2016) requires monthly generator load tests, Caterpillar only recommends weekly
no-load tests, with no mention of monthly tests that are legally required on units supporting lifesafety equipment. Other specific maintenance recommendations differ between similar models of
the same family of generator sets (Caterpillar, 1997; Caterpillar, 2010a; Caterpillar, 2010b;
Caterpillar, 2010c; Caterpillar, 2010d). Manufacturer-certified technicians often contradict
manufacturers’ published recommendations with respect to tests. Some technicians feel that no-

19
load tests damage the engine and should be avoided, while others strongly advocate weekly noload tests, and still others recommend only quarterly maintenance. While Caterpillar publications
recommend weekly and monthly maintenance and tests on all emergency diesel-electric
generator sets, Caterpillar honors the manufacturer’s warranty on generators that receive only
quarterly service provided by qualified technicians.

Table 2. Cummins Power Generator Recommended Maintenance (Loehlein, 2007)
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The published recommendations of Cummins Power Generation (Loehlein, 2007), shown
in Table 2, are more stringent than NFPA 110 (2016). Cummins Power Generation recommends
performing daily checks for a number of items that Caterpillar and NFPA 110 (2016)
recommend performing weekly. Cummins Power Generation explicitly recommends holding
periods of no-load operation to a minimum and recommends a 30-minute generator load test
once a month, similar to the monthly load test required by NFPA 110 (2016) and Joint
Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force Technical Manual TM 5-683 (1995).

HISTORICAL EMERGENCY DIESEL-ELECTRIC GENERATOR RESEARCH
Fehr and Cotter (2014) proposed the methodology used herein to determine the
relationship between generator set maintenance and testing and reliability. Fehr (2014) expanded
and tested this methodology, but data acquisition was limited only to a small number of wellmaintained generator sets to test Fehr’s methods, and did not include enough operational failure
data to achieve statistically significant results. Nevertheless, Fehr’s initial small-scale data
analysis validated the methodology and the data provided important information on the mean
reliability of well-maintained generator sets, even if the 2014 study was insufficient to determine
relationships between maintenance and test predictors and reliability.
The United States Army Corp of Engineers’ Power Reliability Enhancement Program
(PREP) investigated the reliability and availability of emergency generators from studies
compiled from multiple sources in the early 1970s. PREP discovered these earlier studies
contained confusing information, and the database often contradicted itself (Hale & Arno, 2009).
Those studies are obsolete now, but they were the foundation that commercial and governmental
policies for emergency diesel-electric generator set maintenance was built upon.
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The most recent large-scale study on generator set reliability was conducted on behalf of
PREP in the mid-1990s, and the results were compiled in TM 5-698-5 (2006). This was a broad
study looking to update previous records by looking at the contemporary technology equipment
installed since 1971. The PREP study forming the basis for TM 5-698-5 (2006) recognized that
there are differing levels of maintenance for different generators but did not differentiate
between the reliability of each maintenance plan. Instead, the authors chose a cross-section of
generators of differing maintenance to reduce bias so that they could present a single set of
reliability and availability numbers for each category of equipment for the purpose of system
reliability and availability calculations. This PREP study assumed exponential failure
distributions and calculated an annual reliability factor of 0.8838 for packaged diesel engine
generators of 250kW-1.5MW rated capacity in standby duty, based on 672.1 unit-years of
operation with 83 failures. This PREP study calculated an annual reliability factor of 0.5310 for
unpackaged diesel engine generators of 750kW-7MW rated capacity in standby duty, based on
235.4 unit-years and 149 failures.
IEEE 493-2007, often referred to as the IEEE Gold Book, is the commercial standard for
design of emergency and critical power plants. It contains methods for calculating overall power
system reliability and contains reliability and availability values for making those calculations.
IEEE 493-2007 references a 1980 generator survey that states the failure rate of emergency and
standby generators is 0.00536 failures per run-hour and 0.0135 failures per start attempt, with an
aggregated failure rate of 0.1691 failures per year and an average downtime of 478.0 hours per
failure. This differs from the results of a later study presented in the same IEEE document and
TM 5-698-5 (2006), which found 0.1235 failures per year and a mean time to repair of 18.28
hours. While the reduced failure rate from the 1980 study to the late-90s study could be
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explained as increased reliability from technological advances, the order of magnitude disparity
in downtime and mean time to repair is difficult to ignore and could be a result of using small
pools of data or including out-of-control data in the average. The disparity and scarcity of data
from the two primary studies puts the reliability of this data in question. If the reliability of data
for such high profile equipment as generators is in question, the reliability of data for other
equipment with lower incidence of record keeping is also in question.
Fehr (2014) used TM 5-698-5 (2006) methods to calculate an annual reliability factor of
0.921 and 0.074 failures per year based on 126.71 unit-years of well-maintained generator sets in
standby service operation and 9 test and operational failures. This is a much lower failure rate
than 0.1235 (TM 5-698-5, 2006) or 0.1691 (IEEE, 2007) recorded by previous studies. Fehr
(2014) estimated the inherent availability Ai = 0.999712 for the well-maintained generator sets in
that data set, which is an order of magnitude lower unavailability than the Ai = 0.9974 listed in
the PREP database (TM 5-698-5, 2006). It is not clear from prior research whether the
discrepancies between these results is due to higher reliability of the latest models of generators,
due to different maintenance practices, or due to some combination of these or other conditions.

DIESEL ENGINE MAINTENANCE RESEARCH IN OTHER APPLICATIONS
There have been several studies researching preventative maintenance and replacement
cycles for diesel engines in transportation and construction fleets, but emergency generator sets
run at a much different duty cycle with fewer run hours than most other diesel engines and
exhibit different wear profiles. Though the findings of these studies are not directly applicable to
emergency diesel-electric generator sets, the structure of the studies, models used, and other
aspects of this research are useful.
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Márquez and Herguedas (2004) investigated the failure rate of diesel engines powering
earthmoving equipment in mining operations in Spain, concentrating on cylinder liner failures in
1.8MW, 16-cylinder diesel 1900 rpm engines similar to those used for emergency generators.
Through their research, they discovered 50% of the failures were occurring in 24% of the
cylinders and worked with the manufacturer to determine the assignable cause was excessive
vibrations in the crankshaft at high engine inclinations. This allowed the manufacturer to address
the problem in future designs and for the mine maintenance departments to increase preventative
maintenance on the problem cylinders. Márquez and Herguedas (2004) used maintenance
records to conduct this analysis. The records included fifteen trucks with twenty-three failures.
They recognized data censoring and devised a model that was insensitive to the data censoring.
For the analysis, they simplified the data results and performed a bi-parameter Weibull plot of
engine run-hours with linear and quadratic trend regression. They were then able to select a triparameter Weibull to analyze the failure of specific cylinders.
Leung and Lai (2003) investigated the preventative maintenance and replacement of
diesel engines powering city buses in Hong Kong. They reviewed a subset of 2,282 repair
records from buses powered by 171.5kW 1900 rpm turbocharged diesel engines and 134.2kW
1850 rpm naturally aspirated diesel engines. They used the maximum-likelihood density
estimation (MLDE) and nearest-neighbor density estimation (NNDE) procedures with the
sequential method to determine optimal preventative maintenance and replacement intervals. By
these means, they calculated the lowest combined total cost of preventative maintenance,
corrective maintenance, and opportunity costs lost during maintenance and repair. Leung and Lai
determined that the sequential method was better than the non-homogeneous Poisson process
(NHPP) model for analyzing this engine data, as the NHPP model assumed repairs returned the
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system to original condition while the sequential model accounted for slow degradation of
engine components due to use.
The duty cycle of city busses and emergency diesel-electric generator sets differ
considerably. The city buses in Leung and Lai’s (2003) study experience more run-hours in one
or two days than a typical emergency diesel-electric generator experiences in a year, so the
assumptions made by Leung and Lai regarding slow degradation may not entirely apply to
emergency diesel-electric generator sets. The sequential method may not provide any advantages
over NHPP for analyzing emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability.

Table 3. Equipment Failure Rate Multipliers vs. Maintenance Quality (IEEE 493-2007)
Maintenance
Quality
Excellent
Fair
Poor
All
Perfect Maintenance

Transformers

Circuit Breakers

Motors

0.95
1.05
1.51
1.00
0.89

0.91
1.06
1.28
1.00
0.79

0.89
1.07
1.97
1.00
0.84

A study published in 1974 regarding the impact of maintenance on the reliability of
electrical equipment in industrial plants found that maintenance quality and periodicity had a
significant impact on failure reduction. Failure rate multipliers were calculated from this data
showing that excellent maintenance could increase reliability of those power system components
40-120% more than similar components receiving poor maintenance (IEEE, 1974). These values
are shown in Table 3.
The airline industry and FAA found that preventative maintenance was only effective for
items with certain failure patterns and had no benefit for other areas, forming the basis of
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reliability-centered maintenance and failure modes and effects analysis (Moubray, 1997; IEEE
493-2007).

RARE EVENTS SURVIVAL ANALYSIS
While the field of risk analysis includes a great deal of research on rare events, rare
events are considered differently in statistical analysis and risk analysis, as risk analysis
considers events as a combination of occurrence rate and consequence (Osterloh & Jaenish,
2016) while statistical analysis only considers occurrence rate. Another difficulty in researching
statistical techniques for rare events is that there is no single universal definition. Some risk
analysis researchers calculate numerical probabilities while others use subjective definitions and
rely on polls of experts to develop quantitative results. While subjective polling techniques may
be applicable to extremely complex systems that are difficult to mathematically model, or events
so rare there is little hard quantitative data available, they’re less precise in areas where
numerical studies are possible, and can be off by many orders of magnitude (Osterloh & Jaenish,
2016).
Rowe (2006) defines a rare event as one that has np < 0.01 chance of occurring per year,
and defines all others as ordinary events. While total power system failures may be considered
rare events in facilities with power systems designed with redundancy and high availability, the
failure rate of an individual generator set is reported by previous studies as and λ = 0.074 (Fehr,
2014) and λ = .1235 (TM 5-695-5, 2006), neither of which are considered rare events per Rowe.
However, statistical techniques describing ordinary events create difficulties for events that while
perhaps not considered rare, remain uncommon. Some of the challenges present in rare events
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analysis are present in the field of generator set maintenance, such as belief overcoming hard
data.
Xiao and Xie (2016) found maximum likelihood estimator techniques resulted in illposed estimates when no failures were observed and resulted in very high variances when the
time, t, is small. However, Xiao and Xie also found that given enough time, the maximum
likelihood estimate can provide good results. While generator set failures may be observed as
rare by maintainers whose experience is limited to a small set of units, generator set failures are
considered ordinary rate events in statistics. Therefore, increasing the amount of data in the study
may be a reasonable means to achieve high quality results. This finding may help address the
concern raised by Fehr (2014) that poorly-maintained generator sets often have poor quality logs
and are more difficult to acquire data for than well-maintained generator sets. Even if data is
harder to acquire for poorly-maintained generator sets, less data is needed due to the higher
failure rates of those units as compared to well-maintained generator sets for which data is more
readily available, but failure rates are lower.

ANALYSIS METHODS IN RELATED FIELDS
To determine the optimum maintenance cycle of diesel bus engines, Leung and Kai
(2003) used a maximum-likelihood density estimation (MLDE) procedure, assuming a Weibull
estimation. They used η as the scale parameter and m as the shape parameter, with a cumulative
Weibull distribution equation of the form:

𝑡 𝑚

−1( )
𝐹(𝑡|𝜃⃗ ) = 𝐹 (𝑡|𝜂, 𝑚) = 1 − 𝑒 𝜂 , 𝑡 ≥ 0
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Leung and Kai (2003) estimated the value of 𝜃⃗ = (𝜂, 𝑚) using the nearest neighbor
distribution estimation (NNDE).
Márquez and Herguedas (2004) also used a Weibull distribution to determine failure rates
for earthmoving equipment but took a more straightforward approach to calculate Weibull scale
and shape parameters by using spreadsheet software. They graphed distribution function data as
an x/y plot of𝑥 = ln(𝑡) and 𝑦 = ln(ln(1 ⁄ (1 − 𝐹(𝑡)))), where 𝐹(𝑡) is the life distribution
function based on manufacturer laboratory testing, and they used the spreadsheet software’s
built-in functions to calculate quadratic and linear trend lines. If the two trend lines were similar,
they estimated the bi-parameter Weibull distribution using the parameters from the linear
regression. Where the two were not similar, they modified the time origin to reach a better fit and
chose a tri-parameter Weibull instead.
Hale and Arno (2009) used an exponential failure distribution to model emergency
diesel-electric set reliability as R(t)=e-λt, with the failure rate per year (λ) calculated as the total
number of failures divided by the calendar time the records were collected. They calculated
availability as a function of mean time between failures (MTBF), mean down-time (MDT), and
mean time to repair (MTTF), where operational availability (Ao) is Ao = MTBM/(MTBM+MDT)
and inherent availability (Ai) is Ai = MTBF/(MTBF+MTTR). TM 5-698-5 (2006) and IEEE 4932007 use the same methods and nomenclature. For time-truncated data sets where no failures
were recorded, TM 5-698-5 (2006) utilized a χ2 60% single side confidence interval to calculate
λ and MTBF.
Zhou et al. (2014) attempted to develop a survival model for a highly censored sample of
800 utility transformers to gain knowledge regarding transformer lifecycles. Zhou et al. found 44
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failures, only one of which was determined to be age related. With a failure rate of
approximately 0.2% per year, transformer failures in this study were rare events, and Zhou et al.
required special techniques to overcome censoring. Zhou et al. attempted to analyze this sample
using a Weibull distribution, but met with considerable challenge due to the high level of
censoring and dominance of random failures over age related failures. The failure distribution for
this sample more closely resembles an exponential distribution than a Weibull distribution, as is
common in the mid-life cycle of a Weibull distributed group, and Zhou et al. concluded the
sample size was too heavily censored and did not include enough units reaching the end of the
Weibull wear-out cycle.
Relevance vector machine (RVM) (Tipping, 2001) and support vector machine (SVM)
machine learning techniques have been used in several studies related to engine maintenance (Jia
& Zhao, 2006; Wang et al, 2013). RVM and SVM utilize a combination of mathematical
regression and Bayesian statistics to map data points into two different categories. While these
techniques have applications in condition-based maintenance and predictive maintenance, they
are difficult to apply to survival data with high degrees of left truncation and right censorship and
do not appear to have advantages over Cox (1972) regression for this type of survival analysis.
Many research teams including Amorim and Cai (2015); Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May
(2008); Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002); and Kelly and Lim (2000) have discussed methods
developed for recurring events in the medical field. The Andersen and Gill (1982) method is a
counting method formulated in terms of increments in the number of events along the timeline,
but it is restrictive for application to emergency generator set reliability as it requires a rightcontinuous process without left truncation and is intolerant to treatment changes over the life of
the process. The Anderson and Gill (1982) method is used as a basis for many related methods
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that share many of the same application restrictions (Amorim & Cai, 2015; Kelly & Lim, 2000).
The only emergency generator sets that could be analyzed by these methods would need to have
complete records available back to installation and no changes in maintenance or test periodicity
over potentially decades of operation. However, placing such a restriction on data acquisition to
only generator sets with such records and history could introduce bias. The most appropriate
methods for analyzing generator set records must be insensitive to left truncation and right
censorship. Other models discussed by research teams extend from Andersen and Gill (1982)and
share the same limitations or require special cases not applicable to emergency generator set
reliability. Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May (2008) criticize the Andersen and Gill (1982) method
for assuming complete independence between events to be unrealistically simple for events such
as cancer reoccurrence, but this is not necessarily the case for a repairable machine, and models
dependent on stratification of recurrent failure data are difficult to apply to generator sets which
fail in a multitude of ways.
Kelly and Lim (2002) discuss conditional approaches to analyzing recurrent event data
and observed that while conditional approaches assume the current event is unaffected by earlier
events, that assumption can in some cases be relaxed by means of additional covariates to
represent prior events or other dependencies. This approach appears similar in concept to the
introduction of generator set age and run hour covariates independently proposed by Fehr (2014)
to analyze time dependent covariates for generator set age and cumulative run hours within a
Cox linear regression of arbitrary start time. One conditional approach is the Prentice, Williams,
and Peterson (1981) gap-time method, which is similar to Anderson and Gill (1982) but resets
the clock after each event. Gap-time includes stratification in the model, with each failure
representing a different stratum. Unfortunately, gap-time is still sensitive to left truncation and
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requires full knowledge of prior failures to assign strata to each data set, and is thus not suitable
to apply to emergency generator set reliability modeling.

POST-HOC POWER ANALYSIS AND VALIDITY
Numerous methods have been developed for pre-hoc power analysis for statistical
models, but little research has been accomplished regarding post-hoc power analysis of
parametric survival models based upon unconstrained and heavily censored data sets. Existing
literature was reviewed for methods of calculating post-hoc Type II error and realized power.
Schoenfeld (1983), Hsieh and Lavori (2007), Cohen and Cohen (1983), Cohen (1987), Lachin
(1984), and Liu (2014) provided relevant methods for pre-hoc regression power analysis, but not
post-hoc, and not specific to survival analysis. Lachin (1984) spoke directly to survival analysis,
but Lachin’s methods are only applicable to groups with a single binary independent variable and
an exponential failure distribution. Of these methods, Hsieh and Lavori (2007) were the most
relevant to this research and were used herein for pre-hoc power analysis and the estimation of
data required. Although none of the power analysis methods reviewed herein were discussed by
their authors for post-hoc analysis, methods for potential applicability were reviewed.
Lachin (1984) discussed different methods for F-test based calculations of power for
uncensored and censored survival data, but both methods require the calculation of exponential
failure rates λc and λt for the control and treatment groups. While Lachin’s discussed methods are
applicable to designed experiments or data sets where subjects are randomly assigned to either
subpopulation, the Fehr (2014) model includes 26 predictors which are unlikely to all be fully
independent. Without independence of those predictors, single values of λ cannot be accurately
calculated for subpopulations without a large risk of sampling bias in the results. For example,
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the subpopulation for a low-cost generator set model may include a disproportionate sample of
low-cost maintenance, and attempts to calculate a subpopulation λmodel would be biased by the
difference in maintenance. As Lachin’s method is highly sensitive to such sampling bias but does
not provide a means of accounting for it, it cannot be used to calculate power for emergency
diesel-electric generator set research.
Cohen and Cohen (1983) provided a method to calculate n* for multiple regression
correlation based upon the regression variance R2 and tables of values for different degrees of
freedom and several Type I and Type II error levels. Cohen and Cohen (1983) provided
equations both for population R2 and for sample R2 and an equation that, given known n* and R2,
can be solved for power. Cohens’ method, in Cohens’ Equation 3.7.2, was designed for pre-hoc
determination of the quantity of data required and uses the population effects size f2 (Cohens’
Equation 3.7.1), although Cohen and Cohen cautioned against using this for a sample and stated
the F equation (Cohen’s Equation 3.6.1) should be used for sample values.

𝑅2
1 − 𝑅2

Cohens’ (1983) Equation 3.7.1

𝐿
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Cohens’ (1983) Equation 3.7.2
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𝑛∗ =

𝑅2
𝑛−𝑘−1
𝐹=(
)
(
)
1 − 𝑅2
𝑘

Cohens’ (1983) Equation 3.6.1

Post-hoc, n* = n, and are R2 and k are known. Substituting these known values into
Cohen’s Equation 3.6.1 and 3.7.2 and solving for L instead of n* gives Equation 2. As noted by
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Cohen (1987), this permits use of Cohen’s L tables in reverse to look up the observed power β
associated with the experimental results. A direct calculation of this is also supported by the
f2.test function in the R library pwr (Champeley et al., 2016).

(𝑛 − 𝑘 − 1)2
𝑅2
𝐿=(
)
1 − 𝑅2
𝑘

(2)

Cohen and Cohen (1983) provided a similar method to calculate the n* required for each
independent regression coefficient for desired power prior to the experiment, but not a means to
calculate the observed power after data is acquired. Hoenig and Heisey (2001) provided a
method to estimate observed power for regression coefficients directly from the p-values
automatically calculated and provided in many software packages. This method is only
applicable to significant predictors and cannot be used to estimate the observed power for
predictors found not significant in the regression results; attempts to use the p-value to calculate
β from post-hoc predictors excluded from the final regression model do not give valid results.
None of the literature reviewed provided a method for determining the post-hoc observed power
for these excluded predictors and the failure to reject the null hypothesis, only pre-hoc
estimations of power as a function of anticipated R2; Steidl, Hayes, and Schauber (1987)
contends such a measurement is meaningless. Murphy, Myors, and Wolach (2014) discussed use
of post-hoc findings to create an estimate of the potential power of prior research, but did not
present any methods for calculating realized power. Thus, these power estimates can be refined
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using experimental data to increase the accuracy of pre-hoc estimates, but offer little benefit for
model validation.
Hoenig and Heisey (2001) argue that observed power is not useful in post-hoc analysis
due to what they call the power approach paradox, that higher observed power does not imply
stronger evidence for a null hypothesis that is not rejected. In support of this assertion, they
provide several examples where post-hoc observed power analysis presents logical flaws and
often nonsensical results. They further contend that once the confidence interval is calculated,
power analysis provides no further useful information, and recommend post-hoc power analysis
should not be done. Steidl, Hayes, and Schauber (1987) states this similarly, contending that
retrospective power analysis provides results with no relation to true power. These arguments are
themselves not without criticism, but there remains little published literature on the subject. This
is unfortunate given the importance of quantifying observed power and Type II error
probabilities for excluded predictors, but is consistent with the lack of post-hoc power analysis in
prior multiple regression/correlation analysis research. Liu (2014) discusses the relationship
between confidence intervals, power, and precision, but does not provide a post-hoc method to
determine observed β. Steidl, Hayes, and Schauber (1987) and Hoenig and Heisey (2001)
recommend the use of confidence intervals as useful for determining what range the effects size
may be and potentially the low probability than a specified effects size exists. Therefore, while it
may not be possible to directly calculate the probability of falsely failing to reject the null
hypothesis, by calculation of the confidence interval it is possible to make a reasonable
calculation of the probability that the effects size is so small as to not be of practical importance
(Steidl, Hayes, & Schauber, 1987; Lenth, 2007).
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Another question raised by this research relates to validation of the model for
applicability to various subpopulations. Specifically, make, model, and size were included in the
model as predictors, but were not anticipated to have significant results. Cox (1972) nonparametric regression methods can calculate α for these predictors but cannot return any direct
information about β or the risk of falsely failing to reject the null hypothesis that there is no
relationship between generator set make, model, and size and reliability. Steidl, Hayes, and
Schauber (1997), Hoenig and Heisey (2001), and Murphy, Myors, and Wolach (2016) advocated
utilizing the model confidence intervals to qualitatively judge model adequacy, but this does not
provide much useful information on the validity of smaller subgroups. Cohen (1987) provided a
method for analyzing data sets that is applicable to Cox regressions; although this method is only
discussed for pre-hoc power analysis, solving with known values from experimental data can be
used to estimate experimental power and permits to assessment of model validity with more
confidence.
Fehr (2014) made a general a priori assumption that generator set make, model, and size
within the delimitations of this research represent a common population with a common response
to maintenance. Present maintenance guidance (NFPA 70B, 2016) does not make distinctions of
differing maintenance on make, model, or size and there are reasonable arguments for this
assumption supported by many technicians (Walbolt, 2010). Despite such industry confidence,
there is no solid research to support the assertion of common response. Fortunately, this
assumption can be easily tested within the framework of this research by inclusion of make and
model factors and a size covariate in the model. If the p-values for these predictors are found to
be non-significant, then the a priori assumption of a common population with common response
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to maintenance holds. However, if any of these subpopulation predictors are found to be
significant, model validity for these subpopulations must be determined.
If the common population assumption fails, there is little research into subpopulation
validity in survival distributions with high levels of left truncation and right censorship that can
be directly applied to address it. Cohen (1983) presents a related method intended to estimate the
proportion of the variance contribution of the subpopulation Y∙B in equation 4.5.2. B represents
the subpopulation being analyzed and A represents the population containing all others. Y∙B is the
experimental sample data set for subpopulation B, Y∙A is the experimental sample set for the
remaining population, and Y∙AB represents the entirety of the experimental data. Utilizing the F
equation for samples instead of the population effects size f2, and solving for L results in
Equation 3 and permits use of Cohen’s L tables in reverse to look up the observed power β
associated with this data set.
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Cohen (1983) Equation 4.4.2

Cohen (1983) Equation 4.5.2

(3)

However, Cohen’s (1983) F-test statistic for data sets has a weakness when data sets are
not similar size. For example, if Y∙AB represented student GRE scores and Y∙A consisted of
20,000 graduate students while Y∙B consisted of 20 preschoolers, Cohen (1983) F-test Equation
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4.4.2 would inaccurately indicate high power that the two subpopulations were the same. As the
data sets anticipated from this study are likely to include some makes, models, or sizes in much
larger or smaller numbers than others, use of this equation could be problematic.
Cohen’s (1983) more general Equation 3.6.1 does not share the same weakness for
proportionately small sample subpopulations, and Equation 2 derived from this can be directly
applied to each sample subpopulation. However, as the sample subpopulations may be too small
or too homogenous in test and maintenance periodicity to independently derive significant
models, methods comparing Cox (1972) regression models cannot be used with any confidence
of high quality results. As a model already exists from the general population regression, the
regression sum of squares for the final model can be calculated for each sample subpopulation,
and an F test performed to compare each sample subpopulation to the general population. If the
model is valid for the sample subpopulation and the relationship with the subpopulation can be
represented as a treatment in the model, the weighted difference between the sum of squares
response for the subpopulation and general population should be statistically insignificant. If this
test fails, additional interaction terms can be explored that may better represent the
subpopulation, or the subpopulation removed from the study if appropriate.

SECONDARY DATA
Enormous quantities of data exist in the form of historical logs and records from
operations, maintenance, and repair of emergency diesel-electric generator sets, similar to other
existing data across a myriad of applications and industries. The primary advantage of such data
is that it already exists and is therefore often easier to collect than devising and conducting new
experiments. This data also includes real-world performance that’s difficult to replicate in a lab.
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However, those advantages are also disadvantages, as historic logs and records were rarely
recorded under controlled conditions for the sake of pure research, and this secondary data is
often of questionable scientific value for positivistic research due to questionable internal
validity and reliability (Souza-Posa, 2015). Crowder and Lancaster (2008) suggest that such
secondary data is only useful for exploratory research for collection of primary data, but
Crowder and Lancaster were focused more on business data and reports and did not consider the
specific application of secondary data in the form of logs and records.
Historic logs and records for operations, maintenance, and repair represent a special case
subset of secondary data and can be a powerful and economical source of data for analysis if
properly used. Even if they were not originally created for pure scientific research, such logs are
generally intended as an objective series of measurements for engineering studies, and often have
significant practical value to aid managers and maintenance personnel in decision-making
(Márquez & Herguedas, 2004). Equipment logs and records have been used successfully for
research by several teams (Gat & Eisenbeis, 2000; Mathur, 2002; Márquez & Herguedas, 2004;
Devaney et al, 2005; Fehr, 2014). Devaney et al. (2005) conclude that “maintenance logs contain
a potential wealth of information that can be used to improve the maintenance of complicated
machinery, reduce downtimes, and prevent failures.” Herein, the use of historic logs and records
as research data is discussed as well as a review of issues found by researchers and a review of
techniques used to mitigate those issues. A consolidated methodology is presented to minimize
the risk inherent in using handling historic logs and records for scientific research, and to
maximize the research utility from these potentially rich sources of data.
Márquez and Herguedas (2004) examined maintenance records as a tool for root cause
analysis and found unqualified record-keepers, incompetent handling of maintenance data, and
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lack of computerized records represented common problems. They found that data from
equipment had to be screened properly to ensure the data represented the same failure modes in
homogenous equipment under similar conditions. They stressed the importance of computerized
maintenance management and standardized record keeping as very important to structuring
records into a manner to aid decision-making for the maintenance personnel involved, and for
successful exploitation of such data for broader studies. They found the expert judgment of
maintenance engineers to be a significant benefit.
Crowder and Lancaster (2008) asked “What do I need to know?” and “How accurate and
detailed does the data need to be?” and discussed the general use of secondary data in detail. The
techniques Crowder and Lancaster presented were not specific to historic logs and records, but
suggested internal secondary data was more reliable than external secondary data due to the
greater level of access researchers are typically granted for internal data. Crowder and Lancaster
(2008) further stated that secondary data was rarely useful in answering research questions, but
this may be because they were primarily considering financial, sales, marketing and personnel
data and did not list maintenance and operational logs and records or other engineering data
among examples of secondary data considered in their discussion. Some of the techniques
presented are nevertheless applicable to engineering research and describe creation of a
methodology able to take advantage of this secondary data including identifying the problem,
developing an approach, and formulating a research design.
Gat and Eisenbeis (2000) found the service life and low failure rate of some samples to
be a challenge for analysis, and excluded several samples from the data set due to short service
length or the small number of logged failures.
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Fehr (2014) found that even in a homogenous group with similar equipment and common
guidance and policy mandating specific logs be kept, such records were rarely complete and
accessible in practice and mostly existed in handwritten form. Fehr (2014) further found that that
poorly-maintained equipment often also had poor record keeping, potentially introducing
selection bias and skewing studies towards those of well-maintained equipment by the simple
fact that those well-maintained units had the most complete records and were more easily
accessible. Maintenance performed by third parties introduced additional challenges, as each
organization kept records in a different way, and records on some units were split between the
operational organization and the maintenance organization. A lot of manual effort was required
by the researchers to overcome the challenges presented by the inconsistent record keeping, and
the analysis had to be explicitly designed to minimize bias from the data.
Devaney et al. (2005) data-mined equipment maintenance logs of complex machinery,
which largely consisted of terse free-text input. They found that even when such logs are
recorded for the explicit use of long-term tracking of equipment condition, performance, and
reliability, such records included large variation in the input and were often difficult to
consistently interpret via automation. They found that the vocabulary was inconsistent and often
included jargon, and the terminology used didn’t always correspond to systems of interest. They
also found logs to be full of spelling errors, grammar errors, typographical errors, and extremely
terse non-standard abbreviations. They also found that most machines have statistically few
actions logged per year, making such sets too sparse for data-intensive approaches. Despite the
challenges, Devaney et al. (2005) developed a software algorithm using text analytics, clustering
techniques and a case-based reasoning to analyze the maintenance data, demonstrating that
automated methods are possible to apply to historic logs and records.
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Souza-Poza (2015) asserts that the reliability and validity of secondary data must be
verified, and the secondary data must be demonstrable as mind-independent and sufficiently
positivistic to accomplish the research goals.
Márquez and Herguedas (2004), Fehr (2014), and Gat and Eisenbeis (2000) found data
censoring by preventative maintenance to be a significant issue for failure modes and effects
analysis (Moubray, 1997); few managers permit equipment to proceed to the point of failure, and
maintenance actions modified the failure rate distribution. All three research teams used
mathematical techniques tolerant of censoring to analyze the censored data, but such techniques
often require assumptions be made and may not be applicable in all cases or for all failure
distributions.
Márquez and Herguedas (2004), Fehr (2014), and Gat and Eisenbeis (2000) all also
experienced missing data, and small sample sizes meant that only a portion of possible failure
combinations were represented in their data sets. Márquez and Herguedas (2004) and Gat and
Eisenbeis (2000) chose to address this deficiency by only analyzing data for which sufficient
data was available; Márquez and Herguedas (2004) only analyzed cylinders which exhibited at
least three failures within the fleet, and Gat and Eisenbeis (2000) excluded data sets for which
limited data was available. Márquez and Herguedas (2004) developed a data map, but neither
Márquez and Herguedas nor Gat and Eisenbeis attempted any techniques to reconstruct missing
data. Fehr (2014) utilized inductive reasoning to reconstruct portions of incomplete data records
from partial generator data records, such as using knowledge of generator test frequency and
duration to estimate the cumulative generator run hours at different points in time; such
techniques may increase the quantity of analyzable data, but introduce error and risk of
corruption.
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III. METHODOLOGY

Failure modes and effects analysis is a powerful tool for analyzing equipment failure, but
this analysis relies upon observing and measuring failure rates of each system component to
determine failure patterns (Moubray, 1997). This cannot be accurately performed on operational
equipment receiving high levels of preventative and predictive maintenance, as this maintenance
introduces bias and censorship into the data. Known high failure rate items such as batteries,
filters, and lubricating oil are rarely allowed to degrade to the point of system failure in wellmaintained units. Research by Alion Science and Technology (2006) supports this and indicates
other failure modes may dominate. This right censorship of failure data by preventative
maintenance limits the effectiveness of reliability-centered maintenance studies proposed by
Moubray (1997) for this type of application. The effectiveness of the implemented maintenance
and test plans at each facility can instead be measured by survival analysis of the overall
emergency diesel-electric generator system.
Where failure rates exhibit a traditional Weibull wear-out pattern, there is an expected
optimal maintenance periodicity. For such components, there is a point where longer intervals
between maintenance would result in a significant increase in failures but where shorter intervals
show little or no reduction in failures. The point at which longer intervals represent an increase
in failure rate but shorter intervals do not is the point of optimum maintenance periodicity. For
failure modes that result in detectable degradation just prior to failure, this optimal predictive
maintenance periodicity is known as the Nett P-F interval (Moubray, 1997).
Many failure-finding tasks can reduce the operational failure rate at ever decreasing
periodicity intervals with continuous monitoring providing the shortest possible interval and
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near-instant detection of hidden failures. But for intrusive actions or actions that must remove the
generator set from operational service to perform, excessive maintenance results in an increase in
maintenance down time and a decrease in inherent availability. Excessive maintenance can also
increase the risk from human error, increase component wear, or increase the risk of installation
of a defective component causing a failure that otherwise would not have occurred. Thus,
excessive maintenance is not necessarily erring on the side of caution and may result in an
increase of operational risk. For failure-finding tasks where this is the case, the minima of the
failure rate is the optimal point.
The research herein utilizes and refines the methodology developed and tested by Fehr
(2014) to model emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability as a function of maintenance
and test periodicity with the intention of determining optimal maintenance and test periodicities
for maximum operational diesel-electric generator set reliability. This methodology was based
upon examining existing emergency-diesel electric generator set logs for generator sets
supporting critical operations power systems, high-reliability applications, and life safety
applications. These logs were required to be maintained per government regulations (TM 5-683,
1995; NFPA 110, 2016; EPA, 2016) and include records of generator set maintenance, tests,
repairs, run-hours, starts and failures. However, the means of maintaining these records varied,
as no specific formats were mandated. Data gathered from these logs was compiled into the
standardized form in Appendix A (Fehr, 2014), which allowed this data to be combined into a
single database for analysis.
A generalized survival function was created from the generator set history data with
focus on operational failures as the key survivability event. A distinction was made between
failures to start and failures while running. A distinction was also made between failures during
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tests and failures during actual emergency operation. To avoid biasing against sites with high
levels of testing, corrective maintenance and failures during scheduled routine tests were not
included as operational failures in the survival analysis.
Reliability-centered maintenance practices would consider all critical component failures
to be system failures regardless of whether the failures occurred during tests or operation, but
such a philosophy is not appropriate for determination of optimal maintenance levels as it can
introduce bias against sites with more frequent maintenance. In an extreme example, if a
component in an emergency generator set exhibiting hidden failure characteristics is found to
have a mean time to failure of 30 days, sites that perform weekly tests are likely to log a higher
total number of annual failures and annual maintenance downtime than sites performing no
testing. However, the sites performing weekly testing are much more likely to have units that
function during actual emergency operation. From a holistic facility perspective, failures of
emergency diesel-electric generator sets during emergency operation result in facility operational
downtime, while failures during testing do not. As this study was interested in determining
optimal practice for operational reliability and availability, it considered failures discovered and
corrected during testing to be maintenance actions and not failure events. Such a test failure was
only considered an operational failure if the resultant deficiency could not be corrected in time to
avert failure during subsequent emergency operation. Occurrences of operational failures
stemming from test failures were treated as operational failures within this study.
The ability of existing maintenance practices to address failures of individual subsystem
components was implicit within the observed survival function of the system. This approach was
a conservative approach with limited ability to determine the true optimal periodicity of some
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subsystem components, especially where conflation of maintenance or test actions is occurring.
This approach was designed to err on the side of excessive rather than insufficient maintenance.

RESEARCH SCOPE
This research was focused on answering the research question and subquestions for the
subset of emergency generator sets most common at the government and commercial facilities
participating in this study. These facilities predominantly utilize emergency backup electrical
power from water-cooled diesel fuel-injected turbocharged piston engines driving permanentmagnet excited electrical alternators. While such diesel-electric generator sets can be small
enough to roll around a jobsite or large enough to support entire industrial complexes, this
research was focused on fixed generator sets of sizes and duty cycles commonly found in small
and medium data centers, telecommunications sites, hospitals, commercial facilities, and critical
operations facilities. To avoid introducing variances from unique issues that may occur in very
large, very small, or uncommon systems, data acquisition for this study was limited to the subset
of units described in Chapter I, SYSTEM COMPONENTS. Generator sets with similar
characteristics were also included when data was readily available but units such as dieselturbine generator sets and portable generator sets used in prime duty for temporary power were
excluded even when data was available.
Emissions requirements for non-road diesel engines went into effect in 1996 in the
United States and in 1999 in Europe, with phased implementations of increasingly stringent
regulations in subsequent years. Compliance prior to these dates was not required by the United
States’ Clean Air Act of 1990 (Environmental Protection Agency, 2013) or similar European
regulations, but many manufacturers began fielding units well in advance of the required dates,
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often due to commonalities in product lines with road-going diesel engines and other markets
which faced earlier compliance requirements. While diesel-electric generator sets are complex
systems-of-systems, the basic diesel engine technology used is similar across all major
manufacturers and models, as are reliability centered maintenance philosophies. This results in
many common routine maintenance actions between disparate makes and models, and often
similar recommendations for periodicity of those maintenance actions.
The scope of this study was primarily limited to modern, high-efficiency, low emission
generator sets. Generator sets manufactured since the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments were the most common subset in use at the facilities participating in this study, but
little research has been published on the reliability or maintenance of this generation of generator
sets. These generator sets may respond to maintenance and tests differently than older generator
sets from which industry standard maintenance and test policies were developed (Margaroni,
1999). While there is benefit of extending this research to older generator sets that remain in
service, such generator sets are rapidly approaching the end of their design lives, and the return
on investment for data acquisition is greater for newer sets which were anticipated to remain in
service well into future decades. Answering the research question regarding impact of the age of
generator sets on reliability required some older units to be included in the study, but the
emphasis of data acquisition was on units manufactured since 1990.
The scope of this research also extended to determining the impact of human
performance on generator set reliability as related to the training level of servicing personnel.
Specific training of servicing personnel is not typically recorded in maintenance logs, so training
was categorized as factors of one of three general types: staff collateral duty, staff subject-matter
expert (SME) and service visit SME. Collateral duty personnel are comprised of site personnel
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with a minimal level of training who are often expected to perform routine low-difficulty
maintenance and test actions. Both staff and service visit SMEs were assumed to have deep
understandings of the emergency diesel-electric generator sets at the facility. This study
examined the interaction between personnel training and the maintenance and test actions
performed. Knowledge gained from this interaction was anticipated to indicate if total productive
maintenance (TPM) utilizing operators or facilities staff for simple high-frequency maintenance
tasks could be as effective for these generator sets as dedicated maintenance personnel and to
allow managers to quantitatively determine optimal training and manning levels for each facility.
One aspect that was not within the scope of this study was the cost of the maintenance
performed. While knowledge of generator set maintenance and test costs would increase the
usefulness of the findings of this research to cost-sensitive commercial applications, generator
records maintained by sites do not typically include the associated cost of maintenance or repair
actions and would pose significantly increased challenges to data acquisition. This research was
designed to exclusively investigate reliability. This is appropriate for critical operations power
systems where cost is a secondary concern and for facilities where the cost of maintenance is
small compared to the financial impact of a loss of power. Economic calculations beyond the
scope of this research would be required to determine optimal maintenance and test procedures
for non-critical applications where cost is a primary consideration. The reliability model
developed by this research will assist managers of emergency diesel-electric generator systems to
calculate the risk inherent in differing levels of maintenance, tests, and training for their facility,
and to make risk decisions based upon their own estimated costs.
A secondary objective of this research was to estimate the operational availability (Ao)
and inherent availability (Ai) of optimally maintained and tested emergency diesel-electric
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generator sets. While a very important characteristic, determination of the complete emergency
power system Ao and Ai includes many variables that fall outside the scope of this research.
While reliability may be a generalizable property, emergency power system availability is not,
and there are many challenges to be overcome to accurately determine time to repair. For
instance, if an emergency generator set receives no maintenance and then suffers an operational
failure due to a dead battery, is time to repair measured by the number of hours it takes to replace
the battery after the failure was discovery, or should time to repair include the unknown number
of months the failure sat hidden? Response time for staff and availability of spare parts varies
significantly, further complicating generalization.
Maintenance down-time was not included in the survey form, but, except for fluid
changes, valve lashing, and other intensive maintenance, none of the maintenance or test actions
included in the survey require taking the generator out of service or result in operational
maintenance down-time and have negligible impact on Ao. Inspections and fluid level checks do
not impede the ability of generator sets to automatically start, and, even if units are switched off
for worker safety while examining belts and filters, the servicing technicians are available to
immediately restore the units to operational condition. Only sites with the most comprehensive
logs contain sufficient information to accurately calculate repair and maintenance downtimes,
but using these numbers exclusively may have introduced bias.
Response and repair time are anticipated to be shorter for failures discovered during
testing due to technicians being on-site and able to immediately initiate repair actions. The actual
point a failure occurred was rarely recorded, only when the failure was discovered, and the
precise time of repair was not always recorded, so any calculations of availability developed
from the data in this study would include an amount of uncertainty.
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Availability calculations based exclusively on operational reliability would be inaccurate,
as they would not consider unavailability during corrective maintenance. The question of
availability calculation becomes more complicated when considering hidden failures, as it is
impossible in many cases to know when a failure occurred, only when that failure was
discovered. Utilization of Fehr (2014) methods to investigate test failures for the purposes of
availability calculation run the risk of bias against sites with frequent testing. Calculating
availability is outside the scope of this research.

RELIABILITY PREDICTORS
Twenty-one maintenance and test predictors proposed by Fehr (2014) were investigated
in this study, each representing a maintenance or test action with the potential to contribute to
overall system output. These actions, shown in Table 4, were chosen based on periodicity of one
year or less per industry recommendations in NFPA 110 (2016) and are of the form:

xi = j, periodicity of each action, where:
i = action, per Table 4
j = action periodicity, per Table 5

The periodicity of actions xi were measured in years and modeled as covariates.
Modeling these actions as factors would have the advantage of independence from any required
knowledge of the relationship between periodicity and reliability, and would allow for complex
relationships such as bathtub-shaped hazard functions which prior research indicates may be
appropriate for some actions. However, modeling these actions as factors with limited data
exceeded the model capacity for significant results and required the actions instead be treated as
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covariates to reduce the model to a manageable number of degrees of freedom. Table 5 shows
each action periodicity j measured in years between maintenance periods. Continuous monitoring
by watch personnel twenty-four hours a day is approximated as 0.25 hours to reflect response
time. Continuous monitoring only during the normal forty-hour work week is approximated as a
mean response time of 15 hours. This mean assumes that while response time may be within 0.25
hours for forty hours per week, average response time will be eight hours during sixty-four hours
of weeknights per week, and an average of thirty-two hours response time during the sixty-four
hours of weekends. The covariate value for actions performed at “More than three years” is
approximated as five years, and the covariate value for actions marked “Not Routine” is
approximated as seven years. Hours were converted to days for modeling by dividing by twentyfour hours per day, and days to years by dividing by three hundred and sixty-five days per year.
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Table 4. Table of Test and Maintenance Actions
i=
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Test and Maintenance Actions
Maintenance performed, details not known
Check alarms
Check switch & breaker positions
Visual inspection for leaking fluids
Visual inspection of hoses, cables, etc.
Check fuel level
Check oil level
Check coolant level
Check air filter
Battery voltage & physical condition
Check fan belt(s)
Battery resistance or impedance test
Clean unit exterior (including radiator & louvers)
Fuel cleaning (or fluid analysis)
Oil change (or fluid analysis)
Check electrical tightness
Engine intensive maintenance
Generator (electrical) intensive maintenance
Generator set no-load test
Generator set load test on load bank
Generator set load test on operational load
Generator set dead-bus test on operational load
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Table 5. Table of Test and Maintenance Action Periodicity
j=
0.25 hr
15 hr

1 day
7 days
14 days
1/12 yr
¼ yr
½ yr
1 yr

2 yr
3 yr
5 yr
7 yr

Action Periodicity
continuous watch
40hr/week watch
Daily
Weekly
Biweekly
Monthly
Quarterly
6-month
Annual
2 years
3 years
More than 3 years
Not Routine

DATA ACQUISITION
The data acquisition framework from Fehr (2014) was used to acquire data from
operational records of emergency generator systems with diverse maintenance policies.
Managers and maintainers are asked to provide data on the Fehr (2014) Microsoft Excel form
included in Appendix A. As maintenance policies and periodicity for a given unit can change
over time, managers and maintainers were asked to fill out a new form every time maintenance
periodicity for a generator set changed so that each form contained a period of consistent
maintenance. Thus, each form represented a rational subgroup of a single specific generator set
with consistent maintenance and test practices. As an increase in maintenance may be a
managerial response to failure, regardless of whether maintenance practices played a role in the
failure, each instance of change in maintenance policy was individually investigated to prevent
the inadvertent inclusion of bias in the study. The completed and validated forms were compiled
into a single database for analysis.
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The United States Department of Defense and other authorities require facilities to keep
accurate and complete generator set maintenance and operation records from commissioning to
decommissioning, and the Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to levy fines
against organizations that do not keep accurate run logs, but logs were often found to be
incomplete, damaged, or lost. Incomplete data could in some cases be accurately estimated from
interviews with maintenance personnel and other data. Where data such as this was estimated, it
was annotated in the comment field. For example, in a few cases it was necessary to estimate
unknown chronometer run hours at the start of observation period by combining knowledge of
test periodicity and duration with knowledge about historic power failures. Where only the
month or year of the generator set installation date was available, it was estimated for regression
purposes as occurring in the middle of the year or month, and this estimation was annotated in
the comments field. Where no installation date information was known, the installation date was
often able to be accurately estimated using information about the building’s construction date or
extrapolated from chronometer run hours through the known event period. Where a survey form
was incomplete, and data required for regression analysis could not be accurately estimated, the
observation was excluded from the database.
The initiation date of logbooks was often arbitrary, such as the first of the year, or
whenever the previous logbook was filled up. Earlier logbooks were not always available, so
logs for many observations were left truncated. While failure data is important, reporting periods
that do not end in failure are equally as important and were also recorded to avoid introduction of
bias. The resultant data sets from this data acquisition contained significant amounts of left
truncation and right censoring.

53
Many critical operations power systems support sensitive mission functions, and specific
information about facility emergency power systems is often sensitive as well. Care was taken to
sanitize the data of all identifying information such as site name, location, or function. Where
site managers provided identifiable descriptive names for generator sets on the survey forms, the
identifying information was replaced with alternate generic generator name. Likewise,
descriptive information was removed from the comments field when unit data was imported into
the database. The database did not include information about any site’s system configuration or
redundancy; such information is not relevant to the intent of this of research. Instead, a generic
identification number was assigned to each observation, with the identification key and original
survey form maintained in a separate database on a secure government server.
A spreadsheet was developed in Microsoft Excel 2016 to organize the data in a format
that could be easily exported into R for analysis. To eliminate transcription errors, a Visual Basic
for Applications script was written to import data from the Excel forms into the spreadsheet. This
script automatically converted check-box matrices of descriptive predictor periodicities into
numerical periodicities and generated individual observation entries for each logged failure. The
data was thoroughly reviewed for completeness and errors, exported in comma-delimited .csv
format, and imported into R for analysis.

DATA REQUIRED
This study sought to determine the relationship of many predictors, and two important
questions that were asked prior to conducting research was how much data was required to
achieve statistically significant results, and if that data was reasonable to acquire.
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Some knowledge about the survival distributions of the generator sets was required to
estimate the amount of data required. Fehr (2014) applied the PREP (TM 5-695-5, 2006) formula
of λ = [Failures]/[Time] and Reliability R(t) = e-λt, to a sample set of well-maintained generator
sets, and determined the annual reliability of the sample set of well-maintained generator sets
was R(1) = 0.931 and λ = 0.074 failures per year. This was a higher reliability than the published
annual reliability of R(1) = 0.8838 and λ = .1235 failure per year as measured from a diverse data
set of well, average and poorly-maintained units during the PREP study. The mean and standard
deviation of an exponentially distributed function can be calculated from this data as µ = σ = 1 /
λ, with the results µFEHR = 13.514 and µPREP = 8.097. The hazard rate ratio of the well-maintained
and average-maintained generator sets Δ can be calculated as
Δ = (1 / µFEHR) / (1 / µPREP) = 0.599. Data on poorly-maintained units was not available and was
estimated by extrapolation from the PREP and Fehr data. An extrapolated value of µPOOR = 2.684
in combination with µFEHR = 13.514 resulted in an estimated average µPREP = 8.097. From this
extrapolation, the hazard ratio Δ was estimated as Δ = (1 / µFEHR) / (1 / µPOOR) = 0.199.
Schoenfeld (1983) derived the equation (Zβ + Z1-α)2 / (PA PB log2Δ) where Zβ + Z1-α are the
desired 1 – α and β percentiles of the hazard distribution, PA and PB are the proportion of patients
randomized to treatments A and B, and Δ is the hazard rate ratio. This method used the log
hazard ratio to determine the number of deaths (failures) required for statistically significant
results and did not require knowledge about the distribution beyond the proportionality
assumption. Schoenfeld (1983) was silent on the impact of censoring and truncation on this
calculation, but the generator data in this study included a great deal of truncation and censoring.
The only hazard rate data available pre hoc assumed an exponential distribution and was used for
pre-hoc data estimation. With α=0.1, β=0.2, PA = PB = 0.5, and Δ = 0.599, Schoenfeld’s equation
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indicated 94 failures were required to achieve statistically significant results. Assuming the
PREP hazard rate of λ = .1235 failure per year was representative of the average generator set
failure rate, documenting 94 operational failures would require a sample size of 761 standbyyears. With an extrapolated Δ = 0.199 based off the extrapolated µPOOR, however, only 9 failure
events would be required from a sample size of 72 standby-years. Schoenfeld’s method requires
the assumption of binary covariates though, which is not entirely applicable to generator set data
with a spectrum of covariate values.
Hsieh and Lavori (2007) proposed a variation on the Schoenfeld (1983) equation utilizing
the variance instead of the sample proportions, (Zβ + Z1-α)2 / (σ2 log2Δ). Hsieh and Lavori’s
(2007) model supports non-binary covariates and was found by Hsieh and Lavori to be
insensitive to data censoring, although Hsieh and Lavori were silent on the impact of truncation.
Like Schoenfeld’s method, this method does not require assumptions of the distribution beyond
the proportional hazard, but this method still requires knowledge of the hazard rates. If the
acquired data was entirely binary with equal parts 0 and 1, the normalized covariate variance is
σ2 = 0.25, the same as the value of PA PB used in Schoenfeld’s equation where PA = PB = 0.50.
If, however, it is assumed that the distribution of normalized covariates is equally split between
high-quality maintenance (0), average maintenance (0.5), and poor quality maintenance (1), then
σ2 = 0.1667. Including this variance into Hseih and Lavori’s equation indicates 141 failures are
required for Δ = 0.599 and 18 for Δ = 0.199. Assuming that the PREP hazard rate of λ = 0.1235
failure per year is representative of the average of this study, documenting 141 operational
failures would require a sample size of 1142 standby-years. Documenting 18 operational failures
would require a sample size of 146 standby-years.
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Hseih and Lavori’s method is more appropriate than Schoenfeld’s method for estimating
the data required for this study. The exact amount of data required depends on the covariates of
the acquired data, but the amount of data required to achieve statistically significant results was
estimated pre hoc to be achievable with as little as 72 standby years of data if the right samples
were found. Acquisition of 1000-2000 standby years of data was anticipated for this study, which
was anticipated to achieve statistically significant results for at least one research question.

COX/WEIBULL REGRESSION TECHNIQUE
The Cox (1972) proportional hazards regression model was developed by Cox to
represent survival as a function of time. One complication for the application to emergency
diesel-electric generator sets is that there are multiple ways that time can be measured, including
the calendar time in service and the run hours of the unit. While Hale and Arno (2009) assumed
an exponential survival distribution based on calendar time in service when creating their model
of generator set reliability, there is no existing research to show which way to measure time is
the most appropriate. Elapsed calendar time since manufacture Tage is one of the ways in which
time can be measured. However, this presents difficulties within the methods available for this
analysis, and appropriately addressing Tage within the model was one of the earliest and most
difficult problems dealt with by Fehr (2014) in developing the methods used for this research.
One of challenges in utilizing Tage as the Cox survival function time variable is the
repairable nature of the system and potential for each unit to suffer failure multiple times over its
operational life and the restoration of condition by repair. The original Cox function (Cox, 1972)
does not have a mechanism for multiple deaths (failures); it treats mortality as an event that
happens only once in the life of a subject.
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Successive failures beyond the first cannot be entered into a Cox regression utilizing Tage
as the time variable without erroneous results. Assuming an average failure rate of λ = .1235
failures per year as found by PREP (TM 5-695-5, 2006), the average generator set from that
study may have accumulated three failures over a twenty-five-year period. Every operational
failure has operational impact regardless of the age of the generator set that failed, and restricting
this study to only the first operational failure could bias results, so it is appropriate that this
methodology can analyze multiple failures of each unit throughout its operational life. The
methodology must be capable of handling significant amounts of left truncation and right
censorship to analyze data which often has arbitrary start and end dates.
Multiple methods have been developed to adapt the Cox function for recurring or
multiple events (Amorim & Cai, 2015; Hosmer, Lemeshow, & May, 2008; Kalbfleisch &
Prentice, 2002; Kelly & Lim, 2000; Andersen & Gill, 1982), but these methods can only be
applied to a right-continuous process that represents everything that happens up to time t
(Andersen & Gill, 1982) and cannot be applied to left truncated data such as required for this
research.
Fehr (2014) proposed a different method using Cox’s non-parametric distribution. Fehr
(2014) proposed this method because the data was anticipated to have a high degree of left
truncation and a high degree of right censorship and because the baseline hazard model for
generator set reliability was not known and Cox’s non-parametric model does not require any
assumption of baseline hazard model be made (Cox, 1972). However, some assumptions are
required to use Cox’s model to analyze generator set reliability. One assumption required to
apply Cox’s model to a multiple mortality application is the assumption of an exponential
distribution with a base hazard rate that is constant and the same before and after the failure.

58
Under this assumption, the time variable may be reset following each failure or change in
maintenance periodicity; the number of starts in the reporting period ns is reset to zero, the time
in service in the reporting period t is reset to zero, and the run hours in the reporting period Trt is
reset to zero. For the first failure of each unit, t = Tage, but for subsequent failures, attempting to
use Tage would result in invalid regression results as Cox’s model would interpret it not as a
single individual suffering multiple failures, but as multiple individuals with increasingly long
survival life. Therefore, Tage cannot be directly used as a time variable in this method, but Tage
can be included as a covariate predictor to retain incorporation of generator set age in the model.
Similarly, the total cumulative run hours Trtfv can also be included as a covariate predictor. Both
generator set age Tage and total cumulative run hours Trtfv are time dependent properties, but the
end of the observation period is a fixed point in the record, so age and run hours at the end of the
observation period can be treated as static time independent covariates in the Cox (1972)
regression. These properties change over the operational life of the generator set, but selecting
record entry and exit points for the regression permits inclusion of observations taken at any
point in time.
Due to the impact of corrective repairs and data truncation in real world data sets, the
structure of the analysis requires the assumption that emergency diesel-electric generator systems
exhibit exponential base hazard rate characteristics so that random or arbitrary starting points for
each data set can yield valid results. The Cox non-parametric distribution does not require any
assumption of baseline hazard model be made for the regression calculations, but only a failure
model with a constant failure rate function can tolerate data sets with random or arbitrary start
and stop times and still generate valid results. Inclusion of generator set age Tage and total
cumulative run hours Trtfv as covariates in the regression corrects for this assumption. This
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introduces additional error and degrees of freedom into the model, but permits Cox regression
analysis despite long-term trending over multiple failure events.
Inclusion of the generator set age Tage and cumulative run hours Trtfv as covariate
predictors had two advantages. The first advantage is that it allowed inclusion of these predictors
in the model despite the assumption of an exponential distribution. The second advantage is that
it freed the model from the requirement to treat these variables as linear. As covariates, these
predictors could be included into the model as logarithmic, linear, exponential, or other complex
relationships, even within an exponential parametric regression that would normally have a
constant failure rate λ. Representing the generator set age covariate βageTage as the transformed
function 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒 log(𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒 ) has the same mathematical response within the model as a
Weibull base hazard rate function. The same is true for Trtfv. Other transforms may represent
other distributions, although Weibull is the distribution most often associated with engine and
mechanical wear-out. This technique allows the resultant Cox nonparametric proportional
hazards model to simultaneously exhibit characteristics of an exponential distribution and
Weibull distribution with respect to long-term generator set age and cumulative run-hours, and in
this case produced a much higher quality model than an exponential base hazard rate alone.
Thus, even though a parametric model using this technique will have a constant base hazard rate
λ0, the hazard rate h(t|xi) calculated for each unit for any point in time can include complicated
interactions and non-linear relationships.
Equation 3 shows the Cox regression expression representing the log of generator set
calendar age as the nth predictor. Equation 4 shows the generalized Cox proportional hazards
model.
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𝛽𝑛 𝑥𝑛 : = 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒 log(𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒 )

(3)

log(ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖 )) = log(ℎ0 (𝑡)) + ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀

(4)

Equation 5 shows the Weibull baseline hazard function where Tage is age, m is the shape
parameter and η is the scale parameter. Equation 6 shows this expression transformed
algebraically via logarithm into an expression similar to the form used in Cox’s proportional
hazards model in Equation 4.

ℎ0 (𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒 ): =

𝑚 𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑚−1
𝜂

(

𝜂

)

𝑙𝑜𝑔 (ℎ0 (𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒 )) = (𝑚 − 1)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒 ) + log(𝑚) − 𝑚𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜂)

(5)
(6)

If Equation 6 is transformed into to the same notation as a typical Cox covariate by
substituting βT := m - 1, xT := log(Tage), and log(h0) := log(m) + mlog(η), as in Equation 7, it is
clear that the expression relating Weibull’s hazard function based on age is fundamentally no
different than any other regression covariate. In fact, including log(T) as a predictor is
mathematically equal to Weibull’s hazard function and retains the time-dependent properties of
this hazard function without violating the assumption of an exponential baseline hazard model.

𝑙𝑜𝑔 (ℎ0 (𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒 )) = 𝛽𝑇 𝑥 𝑇 + log(ℎ0 )

(7)
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Substituting this transformed Weibull expression of the time covariate in as the baseline
hazard function in the Cox proportional hazards model of Equation 4 reveals the form of a
standard exponential parametric hazard distribution shown in Equation 8, or, as used in this
research, Equation 9.

log ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖 ) = log(ℎ0 ) + ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽𝑇 𝑥 𝑇 + 𝜀

(8)

log ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖 ) = log(ℎ0 ) + ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒 ) + 𝜀

(9)

In this way, t may be utilized as the regression time variable for each observation period
with arbitrary start time set to 0 while simultaneously retaining any Weibull hazard distribution
contribution related to the true age of the generator set. As the Cox log likelihood estimation
algorithm only utilizes the final event or truncation time, substituting a fixed value of Tage for
each observation in place of the normally unconstrained Weibull time variable is valid and does
not bias results. Any number of time-dependent variables can be included in the Cox regression
in this manner, permitting quantitative calculation of complex systems with multiple independent
time dependencies.
Including the transformed Weibull expression as a covariate predictor in a parametric
proportional hazards model with a nominal exponential base hazard rate results in a distribution
displaying aspects of multiple exponential and Weibull distributions. This parametric model can
be represented as a model with both exponential and Weibull base hazard rates. The Weibull
shape parameter m can be calculated from the βT values returned by nonparametric Cox
regression as m = βT + 1. For simple models with a single time dependent predictor of the form
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log(T), the scale parameter can be calculated from the parametric regression results. If multiple
time-dependent predictors of the form log(T) are included in the regression, the Weibull scale
parameters become conflated into the h0 scalar and are not as easily separated. This still results in
a useful model, as the individual contributions of each constituent component remain included in
the resultant hazard function. Hazard curves may be calculated from this model by Cox (1972)
methods.
One weakness of this method is that the limit as T approaches zero increases
logarithmically over a very short time spans and becomes infinite at log(0). This could lead to
over-estimations in survival functions for samples where T=0. Because of this, time values must
be constrained or transformed so that T > 0.
Rodriguez (2010) showed that a regression model consisting of a single covariate of the
form log(t) is a special case where the proportional hazards model multiplied by an accelerated
life expression yields the same result as an accelerated life model multiplied by a proportional
hazard expression. This relationship is does not hold when multiple time dependent covariates
are added into the models, and is not otherwise similar to the methods herein, but did recognize a
connection between a covariate of the form log(t) and the Weibull distribution.

DELIMINATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This study assumed prime and standby rated generators in emergency service share a
common response to test and maintenance periodicity and can be directly compared. This
assumption was based upon the common practice of de-rating a standby generator by ten percent
and labeling it as a prime-rated generator. This assumption may have increased the error of
calculations of relationships with generator set size and loading.

63
This study assumed data gathered will be accurate and not tampered with, filtered, or
otherwise corrupted by maintenance personnel trying to hide mistakes or lapses in proscribed
maintenance or tests. Failures attributable to human error may be entered in official logs as an
equipment failure or an unknown failure by unscrupulous personnel and would be
indistinguishable from actual equipment failures by this methodology. As this study was looking
at aggregated failures of all causes and was largely blind to specific cause attribution, impact
from misattribution of failures was anticipated to have minimal negative impact on study results.
However, the methods used were not capable of determining whether maintenance and tests were
performed, only that records indicate they were performed. This aspect could potentially bias
results if widespread falsification of records occurred.
This study assumed that historic maintenance records were accurately interpreted and that
the survey form was consistently understood and reported. All survey forms were reviewed for
completeness and consistency with past records prior to incorporation into the study database.
This study assumed the quality of maintenance was consistent between sites of similar
personnel training and maintenance and test periodicity. As training and personnel qualifications
and competency varied, the quality of maintenance performed may also have varied. This
methodology had no means with which to gauge maintenance quality beyond the general training
category of servicing personnel.
It was assumed that diesel-electric generator sets adapted for use as spark-ignition natural
gas generator sets and otherwise sharing identical parts shared identical characteristics and
responses could be included in the sample population as diesel-electric generator sets.
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IV. ANALYSIS

DATA
One thousand two hundred and eighty one (1,281) standby-years of generator set data
was acquired for this research from 239 generator sets, capturing 58 operational failures from
40,161 run-hours of operation. This data was provided from multiple sources including the
Department of Defense and commercial providers of maintenance and repair services. The
sample population size exceeded the anticipated minimum 1142 standby-year size, but the 58
operational failure events within that data was much smaller than the 141 operational failures
anticipated to be required to achieve for significant results. This appears to be due to the sample
population of Department of Defense and commercially maintained units in this study to be
much more reliable than anticipated based on previous findings by PREP (TM 5-695-5, 2006) or
the small scale study in Fehr (2014).
The sample population included generator sets between 10kW and 2000kW with a
324kW mean generator set rating. A bubble chart depicting the distribution of data from different
size units is shown in Figure 3; the small bubbles represent right-censored observations and the
large bubbles represent observations ending in operational failure.
The oldest generator sets in this study were 43 years old, and five were older than 35
years, but the mean age of generator set in this study was 11.2 years. The mean age of generator
sets experiencing operational failures was 12.2 years. Figure 4 shows a summary of generator set
records and failures by age.
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Figure 3. Data distribution, generator size (kW) vs. record length

Most generator sets in this sample population received regular maintenance and could be
considered well or very well maintained. Few records were obtained of generators receiving little
or no maintenance, as reliable records proved difficult to obtain. To avoid the introduction of
selection bias, generator sets whose records were only available because a failed generator was
repaired were excluded. Only records for subpopulations believed to be free of selection bias
were included. A portion of the generator sets included in the sample population of this study
were units where maintenance contracts lapsed due to financial constraints and were later
renewed, permitting complete and accurate knowledge of the maintenance history of these units
even though no logs were recorded during the period of no maintenance. The only generator sets
in this study receiving no maintenance or testing at all were four 600kW generator sets in a new
building that were installed without being configured for automatic exercise and with no
maintenance provided until several years after installation, and one 60kW generator set wherein
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the exerciser was not functioning during a period of lapsed maintenance. In the other cases with
lapsed maintenance, automatic engine exercisers continued providing weekly no-load tests
despite no other maintenance being performed.

Figure 4. Summary of generator set records and operational failures by age

Maintenance records often listed component failures without clarity on whether the
failure occurred during a test or during operation. Descriptions like, “generator failed to start
during outage,” were clear, but other descriptions were not always easily interpretable. It was
generally assumed that records stating, “unit is alarming” referred to test failures while
“generator did not start” referred to operational failures unless occurring during a scheduled
maintenance visit. Dispatch personnel of one company indicated electronic maintenance records
stating, “customer reported” could also mean, “technician reported” as their work tracking
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system did not make a distinction when repair orders were called in. Test failure information was
not collected for most units, but frequent test failures were noted anecdotally by the research
team while reviewing maintenance logs; a thorough review of one subpopulation deemed typical
found test failures occurred at a rate of 14:3 compared to operational failures.

INITIAL ANALYSIS
Analysis began with the Cox log likelihood regression model shown in Equation 1, where
xi represented the covariate predictors in Table 4, xbi represented the training factors of the
servicing personnel, and βi and βbi represented the regression coefficients. Make, model, age, run
hours, capacity, load, and the predictors in Table 1 were included in the initial regression model.
Training was not initially included, as it was intended as an interaction component to be
combined with a performed maintenance or test action. The event response was the operational
failure Boolean indicator Fov. The periodicity of maintenance and test action predictors in Table
4 was measured in years or fraction of a year. These predictors were treated as covariates with
logarithmic and second order predictors tested for significant predictors to determine the
mathematical relationship to failure, especially for complicated relationships where failure rates
may not only increase with too little maintenance but also with too frequent maintenance.
The regression was performed independently using time t and run-hours Trt as the time
variable. There was insufficient data available on the number of starts ns to include ns as a time
variable. The number of starts was determined to largely be a function of test periodicity within
the sample population and was excluded from the regression model as these predictors were
already included. The Fehr (2014) framework included a normalized weighted time function,
tw(t,ns,Trt) = ωtt + ωnns + ωTTrt, to develop a single general regression model of generator set
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reliability as a function of time in standby service, the number of starts, and run hours.
Statistically significant models were developed using standby time t, but no statistically
significant models using time as run-hours Trt were found, leaving standby time t as the only
significant time variable. It was concluded from this result that calendar time in emergency
standby duty is a more appropriate metric for time than cumulative run hours. Weights were set
as ωt = 1, ωn = 0, and ωT =0, and so tw(t,ns,Trt) = t.
To remove left truncation of prior failures and the associated bias, time was normalized
as t = 0 for the start of each observation period and counted in years to the end of each
observation period. This was necessary for truncated records as the regression would otherwise
assume the generator set had operated to that point since installation without failure, and it would
create bias in the regression. Run hours were likewise set as Trt = 0 at the start of the observation
and counted in run hours accumulated to the end of the observation. Time t and run hours Trt
were reset to 0 for the next observation following each failure event. This method was
independently developed by Fehr (2014) but is similar to the method proposed by Thomas and
Reyes (2014) for Cox regression models with time-dependent covariates. This method removes
evidence of left truncation from the observation record, but any potential time-dependent
relationship was preserved by the inclusion of the age covariate log(Tage) and run hours covariate
log(Trtfv) in the model as regression covariates. This further permitted analysis of other orders of
these predictors and permitted analysis of complex relationships independent of any
assumptions. As shown in Chapter III, inclusion of log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) as covariates is
mathematically identical to inclusion as Weibull base hazard rates, and the contributions of each
to the model can be calculated directly from a standard Cox regression. Thus, this initial model
included the simultaneous calculation of one constituent exponential function, two constituent
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Weibull functions, and the other maintenance, test, and generator set property predictors. An
additional factor, xsrc, was included to test for bias from the data source. The initial model tested
is shown in Equation 10.

22

log ℎ({𝑡}|𝑥𝑖 ) = log(ℎ0 ({𝑡})) + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒 + 𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽𝑘𝑊 𝑘𝑊
𝑖=1

(10)

+ 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒 log(𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒 ) + 𝛽𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑣 log(𝑇𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑣 ) + 𝛽𝐿 𝑥𝐿 + 𝛽𝑠𝑟𝑐 𝑥𝑠𝑟𝑐 + 𝜀

The statistical software package, R, with the survival and eha packages (Broström, 2011)
was selected for this analysis as it supports Cox and parametric regression models and includes
functions insensitive to left truncation and right censorship. Data was analyzed using the
functions surv, coxph, coxreg, cox.zph, resid, and survfit, as well as plot, summary, and other
standard R tools. The coxph function was used for bidirectional stepwise regression as it was
more tolerant of poorly fitting data than coxreg, and coxreg was used to generate log likelihood
values to compare the best fitting models. The cox.zph function was used to test the
proportionality assumption and the resid function to analyze the residuals. Bidirectional stepwise
regression was used beginning with the log likelihood regression model shown in Equation 10.
Backwards stepwise regression was used iteratively to eliminate the least significant predictors
from the model. Forward stepwise regression was then used to add predictors back into the
model one at a time to ensure none were erroneously removed. Bidirectional stepwise regression
was further used to investigate other combinations of predictors, with predictors chosen based on
interim stepwise models. Predictors with “NaN” Z and p values were removed from the model
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via backward stepwise regression until the regression results converged. Once the regression
results converged, the least significant predictors were removed one at a time through backward
stepwise regression until all remaining predictors were significant. The log likelihood method
was used in conjunction with p-tests to determine the most appropriate model. The initial
regression model was also analyzed with the stepAIC function of the MASS package (Ripley,
2017) with identical results. As very few predictors were found to be significant, the use of more
sophisticated operations research methods for model building like simulated annealing and
Markov-chain Monte Carlo analysis was not utilized.
After the model in Equation 2 was reduced to only contain significant predictors, the
second order interactions of Equation 1 were added by forward stepwise regression including
interactions between test and maintenance predictors and interactions with the training
predictors. Alternatives to log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) were tested via substitution and forward
stepwise regression to eliminate assumptions of mathematical relationship, including log(log(T)),
T, T2, and eT.
This model was then fitted to a parametric model via piecewise constant hazard analysis
to determine the baseline hazard function value.

COX REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
Cox regression analysis using the coxph and coxreg functions in R found the two Weibull
predictors for age log(Tage) and run hours log(Trtfv) to be statistically significant in nearly all
interim and final models with p < 0.01 in the most significant models. Five maintenance
predictors, x12, x13, x16, x17, and x18 were found to be significant with p < 0.1 when combined with
log(Tage) and log(Trtfv), as were the generator set parameters for size kW and load xL and the
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control factor for source xsrc. However, none of these predictors were found to be significant
when applied in any combination except one-at-a-time in a model with log(Tage) and log(Trtfv).
Nor were any training predictors found to be significant in combination with these predictors.
Further investigation revealed a large degree of conflation between x12, x13, x16, x17, and x18, as
well as some potential conflation with kW, xL, and xsrc. This was due to a large portion of the data
coming from either Department of Defense sources which had some variance in periodicity but
were still largely homogenous or third-party contractors which also had some variance in
periodicity of some maintenance items, but were even more homogenous. The predictors that
showed the highest significance in the regression were the predictors that had the largest
differences in periodicity between these two sources.
Two new variables were created to adjust for this conflation to represent different
archetypes of the conflated predictors, with x23 representing the shortest periodicity of touch
labor of any sort and x24 representing the shortest periodicity of any type of generator run test.
Two new accompanying training predictors xb23 and xb24 were also created. Training predictors
x23 and x24 were found not to be significant; however the accompanying training predictors xb23
and xb24 were both found to be significant in interim models for staff subject-matter expert
maintenance and tests. No statistically significant difference was found between site visit
subject-matter expert maintenance and staff collateral duty maintenance for this data. This raised
the question: is the mere presence of a staff subject-matter expert as or more important than the
periodicity of maintenance that subject-matter expert performs, or is something else occurring?
An in-depth review of the data revealed that the training factors were highly conflated
with the most significant predictors, and that the significance of the maintenance predictors
appeared to be highest in the predictors that had the least homogeneity across the subpopulations.

72
The maintenance predictor for electrical tightness x16 had the highest predictor significance and
overall model quality in interim models and was selected for the final model. No failures related
to electrical tightness maintenance were observed in any unit of the sample population in tests or
operation, but this predictor was nevertheless found significant in the Cox model with
p = 0.0469. This indicator is not only highly conflated with the training predictor xb23, but also
reflects the largest difference in periodicity between units maintained by staff subject-matter
experts and units maintained by contractors. Every site with a staff subject-matter expert
performed this maintenance at least annually, while very few sites without staff subject-matter
experts performed it at all. This predictor may not have significance from indicating the
periodicity of electrical tightness, but significance from reflecting the level of overall generator
maintenance intensity, allowing it to effectively act as an analogue representing a combination of
maintenance, testing, and training.
Generator set size kW was statistically significant in an interim model with just log(Tage),
log(Trtfv), but with both kW and x16 in the model, the statistical significance of generator set size
reduced to outside of the the α error threshold, indicating a degree of conflation and risk of Type
1 error. This may be due to stratification and bias in the data, as the mean contractor-maintained
units in this study tended to be smaller than the mean units maintained by staff subject-matter
experts. Correlating against the training indicator for x16, xb16, the average size of staff subjectmatter expert generator sets was 770kW in the data acquired while the average size of service
visit subject-matter expert was 233kW. No statistically significant relationship between
generator set reliability and generator size was found in the Cox regression analysis aside from
one incomplete interim model. There is insufficient evidence to suggest generator size is a
statistically significant predictor of reliability.
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Generator set load was statistically significant in a model with just log(Tage), log(Trtfv),
and xL, but with both xL and x16 in to the model, the statistical significance of generator set load
reduced to outside of the α error threshold, indicating a degree of conflation. This may due to
stratification of the data and a degree of conflation with x16 as most contractor-maintained units
in this study utilized automatic weekly no-load tests where xL = 0kW and reduced the mean load
of the subpopulation, while few sites with staff subject-matter experts ran no-load tests and most
only ran monthly load tests. Correlating against the training indicator for x16, xb16, the average
loading of staff subject-matter expert generator sets was 12% in the data acquired, while the
average loading of contractor maintained size was 2%. These numbers are unlikely to be
accurate, as accurate load data was difficult to obtain for many generator sets, especially for
those units whose history was compiled by contractor maintenance records that did not include
information about facility load. These units all utilized regular no-load tests, so typical loads
were approximated as 0% when this maintenance data was imported into the database. However,
the actual average load should be higher since these generators support their facilities during
utility outages and the facilities are unlikely to be at 0% load. There were reports noted
anecdotally during data acquisition as indications of wet stacking of some lightly-loaded units,
but no clear statistically significant relationship between generator set reliability and generator
set load was found in the Cox regression analysis of this data.
Sensitivity analysis was performed on the data with six different test data sets eliminating
certain subgroups or injecting erroneous failures to determine if the strong statistical significance
of log(Tage) and log (Trtfv) from the regression may be resulting from failed repair attempts or the
relatively small number of older generators. Regression tests were performed after removing all
generator sets older than twenty-five years, younger than five years, and reporting periods of less
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than six months, and by changing the status of data from some of the oldest units from censored
to failure, but the regression relationships varied little during this sensitivity analysis. This
increases confidence that the relationships determined by the Cox regression exist in the sample
population and are not purely statistical chance.
The resultant Cox model selected from the analysis is show in Equation 11 and includes
log(Tage), log(Trtfv), and x16 with coefficients calculated from the regression.

log ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖 ) = log(ℎ0 (𝑡)) − 1.476 log(𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒 ) + 0.700 log(𝑇𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑣 ) + 0.240𝑥16 + 𝜀

(11)

The proportionality assumption was tested on Equation 11 utilizing the cox.zph
proportionality test function and resid residuals function which validated the proportionality
assumption. The regression functions, test results, residuals, and survival fits associated with the
analysis are shown in Appendix B.
Predictor significance is presented in Table 6 as a listing of the Wald p-values of each
predictor when added as a fourth predictor to the model of Equation 11 and as a replacement for
x16. Different order time predictors replaced the Weibull component were also tested, either as an
additional predictor or as a replacement for the relevant time predictor. For the special cases of
log(Tage) and log(Trtfv), the other time predictor was removed from the model. Predictors with
significance within α ≤ 0.10 are notated with *. Predictors selected for the final model are
notated with **.
The survival fit of the Cox regression using mean covariate values is shown in Figure 5.
However, while the coxreg and coxph functions deal properly with log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) in the
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computations, the survfit function plot treats both log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) as static covariates
based on the sample population mean. The survfit function assumes all generator sets are
eternally 12.4 years old with 395 run hours, and does not accurately represent the time
dependency of these covariates. This issue will be addressed in greater depth during the
parametric regression analysis.

Table 6. Table of Predictor Significance When Added to or Replacing a Potentially Conflated
Predictor in the Model of Equation 11.
Predictor
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7
x8
x9
x10
x11
x12
x13
x14
x15
x16
x17
x18

Addition
p-value
0.751
0.914
0.931
0.934
0.931
0.871
0.871
0.871
0.872
0.872
0.866
0.565
0.731
0.606
0.752
0.047**
0.572
0.572

Replacement
p-value
0.971
0.897
0.833
0.83
0.833
0.661
0.661
0.661
0.666
0.666
0.657
0.048*
0.086*
0.107
0.905
N/A
0.059*
0.059*

Predictor
x19
x20
x21
x22
x23
x24
xb23
xb24
kW
xL
xsrc
log(log(Tage))
log(Tage)
Tage
log(log(Trtfv))
log(Trtfv)
Trtfv
log(x16)

Addition pvalue
0.504
0.742
0.896
0.993
0.867
0.873
0.233
0.243
0.506
0.173
0.434
0.678
0.000018**
0.313
0.236
0.007**
0.379
1.000

Replacement
p-value
0.306
0.157
0.106
0.101
0.658
0.847
0.078*
0.078*
0.094*
0.062*
0.039*
0.0008*
0.0004*
0.0096*
0.026*
0.023*
0.025*
0.567

0.6
0.4
0.0

0.2

prob(Survival)

0.8

1.0
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Figure 5. Survival fit of regression by time in standby service, h(t).

PARAMETRIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS, FULL MODEL
This study required the assumption of an exponential base hazard rate to permit Cox
regression analysis of multiple-failure systems. While Weibull base hazard rates are supported
within this method, h0 must be a constant, h0 = λ. This delimitation permitted taking the Cox
regression results in Equation 11 to create the parametric hazard function in Equation 12.

ℎ(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑒 0.240𝑥16 −1.476 log(𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑒)+.700 log(𝑇𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑣)+𝜀

(12)

This hazard rate is time dependent due to the Weibull relationships of log(Tage) and
log(Trtfv). As time t as used in the Cox regression is not in this equation, the arbitrary measure of
time and arbitrary establishments of t = 0 as used in the Cox regression have little meaning. A
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more meaningful unit of measurement for the parametric model is absolute time from the
original installation of the generator, Tage = 0. Therefore, in the parametric mathematical model
Tage = t, it can be represented with t. Run hours Trtfv is time dependent as well, and it will never
decrease over time, but Trtfv is not necessarily linear. The mean annual run-time in the sample
population was 31.2 hours per year, but this differs randomly from year to year and from
different test periodicities. Different run hours are explored later in the discussion, but Trtfv was
approximated for this analysis as related to the mean annual run-time for the sample population
multiplied by the generator set age, Trtfv = 31.2Tage. This approximation permits further
development of this parametric equation into the more standard time dependent form in Equation
13. In this form, t represents the time passed since generator set installation, as measured in
years.

ℎ(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑒 0.240𝑥16 −1.476 log(𝑡)+.700 log(31.2𝑡)+𝜀

(13)

The presence of two time-dependent Weibull predictors log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) in the
model pose challenges for parametric regression as standard tools like the phreg function in R
are not structured to deal with repairable systems. The parametric regression must use Equation
12 to develop regression coefficients, but simultaneously use Equation 13 to fit the parametric
model to the data. None of the techniques proposed by Thomas and Reyes (2014) or Fehr (2014)
yielded accurate results due to the inability of the function to accurately model Tage and Trtfv as
time dependent variables. The phreg function extensions required for parametric regression this
have not yet been developed. The regression was tested in R to see what the results would be,
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and while the parametric regression results from phreg returned very similar predictor
coefficients as the Cox non-parametric regression, phreg was unable to accurately fit h0(t) to the
data due to function limitations, resulting in nonsensical hazard rates and an extremely poor fit to
the actual data.
It was instead chosen to apply a piece-wise constant hazard model in Microsoft Excel
which effectively permitted treating the complex relationship as a summation series of standard
exponential distribution expressions. This method leveraged the predictor coefficients returned
by the Cox model and allowed the iterative fitting of h0(t) values to the data until a good fit was
achieved. As this methodology had an underlying assumption of an exponential distribution, it
was assumed that h0(t) = λ, with a single value of λ for all populations. The only variable left
unsolved in h(t) is λ. A piece-wise constant hazard parametric model was constructed using
Equation 13 and the Cox (1972) survival equations. The following equations were used to build a
piece-wise constant hazard parametric model as s spreadsheet in Microsoft Excel.

𝑓 (𝑡) = ℎ(𝑡)𝑆(𝑡 − 1)
𝑇

𝐹 (𝑡 ) = ∑

𝑓(𝑡)

𝑡=0

𝑅 (𝑡) = 𝑒 −ℎ(𝑡)
𝑆 (𝑡) = 𝑒 −𝐹(𝑡)

To fit the model to the data, the sample population data was stratified into two
subpopulations based upon existing stratification of x16, one subpopulation with x16 = 7 years and
one subpopulation x16 ≤ 1 year. The value of 7 was selected to represent units receiving no
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maintenance by Fehr (2014). The mean value of x16 for the latter subpopulation was 0.45 years.
Sample mean time between failures MTBF = Σ t / Σ Fov = 20.7961 years as calculated from the
raw data for the subpopulation with x16 = 7 years, and 60.2178 for the subpopulation where
x16 < 7 years. The equation Rdata = e-1/MTBF yields an estimation of 98.4% and 95.3% reliability for
each respective subpopulation. These values were compared to the average reliability R(t) of the
time-dependent model, which was weighted by a histogram function of the age of the generators
in the sample pool. Values for λ were iteratively selected to minimize the variance between the
model prediction for the two subpopulations and the sample MTBF. A value of λ = 0.00696 was
found to yield the best model fit using these reliability estimators. The final parametric model,
where t represents the age of the generator set in years, is shown in Equation 14. The hazard
function values for the two subpopulations are plotted in Figure 6 for comparison. The survival
functions are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8.

ℎ(𝑡) = 0.00696𝑒 0.240𝑥16 −1.476 log(𝑡)+.700log(31.2𝑡)

(14)
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Figure 6. Generator reliability parametric model stratified hazard function values

Figure 7. Generator reliability parametric model for the x16 ≤ 1 subpopulation
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Figure 8. Generator reliability parametric model for the x16 = 7 subpopulation

This model yielded a weighted average annual reliability for x16 = 7 years of 94.7%
compared to the sample subpopulation net annual reliability of 95.3%. This model yielded a
weighted average annual reliability for x16 = 0.45 of 98.9% compared to the x16 ≤ 1 sample
subpopulation net annual reliability of 98.4%.
The fitted models were visually compared to the Nelson-Aalen estimators (Müller, 2004)
for goodness-of-fit and were found to be consistent with the data. The Nelson-Aalen estimators
were calculated in Microsoft Excel using a Boolean summation algorithm with record lengths
rounded up to the next whole year. The data was stratified by x16 = 7 and x16 ≤ 1 and the NelsonAalen curves are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10. The Nelson-Aalen curves did not reflect as
many early deaths as the infant mortality curve of log(Tage) plots would indicate, but instead
reflected relatively linear rates with sudden knees and low failure rates for older units. Using
Microsoft Excel to fit a curve to match the shape of the Nelson-Aalen plot for x16 = 7 yielded a
linear plot as the highest R2 = 0.96. The exponential trendline fit in Microsoft Excel yielded an
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R2 = 0.83 and logarithmic trendline fit yielded an R2 = 0.81. Despite having similar R2 values,
these two trendlines had opposite shaped concave and convex curves. Trendlines fitted by
Microsoft Excel to the x16 ≤ 1 sample subpopulation yielded lower R2 values, with a maximum
R2 = 0.71 for logarithmic and 0.47 for linear. Microsoft Excel would not fit an exponential curve
for this data set. In both cases, the logarithmic curve was observed to have a shape closely
resembling the model cumulative distribution function; in the case of x16 ≤ 1 the scale was also
similar, and the plot nearly identically matched the cumulative distribution function.
One interesting aspect of this model is that the two most significant predictors, log(Tage)
and log(Trtfv), were found to have opposite signs. This model predicted generator sets will
become more reliable with age, but less reliable with more run-hours. The combination of these
two predictors resulted in relatively static hazard functions once past the infant mortality stage,
and helps explain the observed low failure rate of older generator sets while remaining consistent
with logical expectations that generator sets approaching manufacturer design limits of
maximum run hours will be less reliable.

83

Figure 9. Generator reliability parametric model for the x16 ≤ 1 subpopulation with Nelson-Aalen
estimator.

Figure 10. Generator reliability parametric model for the x16 = 7 subpopulation with the NelsonAalen estimator.
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PARAMETRIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS, SIMPLIFIED MODEL
The Cox (1972) parametric proportional hazard model combining one exponential and
two Weibull base hazard rate relationships resulted in a high quality model fits this data well, but
there is potential benefit to also investigating a simpler model that could be more easily applied
to practical engineering problems and might better benefit non-academics more interested in
practical use of this research than the pure science and mathematics driving it. Therefore, a
simplified time-independent model was developed without log(Tage) or log(Trtfv) and compared to
the full model. One immediate benefit of the simplified model is that removal of the time
dependent predictors permitted standard functions in R to be used. The Cox regression in coxreg
in R of the simplified model function with x16 as the only predictor was significant at p = 0.084
for covariate x16 and p = 0.0325 for the model with a model maximum log likelihood of -279.75.
This was much lower quality than the model in Equation 12, but still significant with α ≤ 0.10
and of a form that can be analyzed in R using standard functions. This simplified model from
coxreg is shown in Equations 15 and 16. The parametric model from phreg is shown in Equation
17 and Figure 11. The goodness of fit of this model is shown in Figure 12. The Cox regression
using run hours as time yielded an identical model; the full regression information,
proportionality test results, and residuals of both models are included in in Appendix B.

ln ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖 ) = ln(ℎ0 (𝑡)) + 0.199𝑥16

(15)

ln ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖 ) = ℎ0 (𝑡)𝑒 0.199𝑥16

(16)

ℎ(𝑡) = 0.0116𝑒 0.199𝑥16

(17)

85

Figure 11. Simplified model parametric functions.

Figure 12. Graphical goodness-of-fit test of the simplified model, Exponential vs Cox

86

The simplified model yielded an exponential failure distribution with a constant hazard
rate of λ = 0.01161. When applied to the weighted reliability piecewise-constant hazard model
developed for the full model, the results had less variance from sample MTBF than the full
model. The simplified model predicted an annual reliability of 95.4% for x16 = 7 years compared
to the sample subpopulation annual reliability of 95.3%. This model yielded a weighted average
annual reliability of 98.8% for x16 ≤ 1 year compared to the sample sub population net annual
reliability of 98.4%. The full and simplified model returned very similar values for the x16 ≤ 1
subpopulation, 98.9% and 98.8% respectively, but much larger differences between values for
the x16 = 7 subpopulation, 94.7% and 95.4% respectively.
The visual comparison of the hazard functions of the full and simplified models in Figure
13 reveals the time dependency of the comparison. The full model and simplified model may
have yielded similar results for averages of large blocks of generator sets, but the hazard function
and reliability predictions differed by considerable amounts, especially for younger and older
generator sets where the differences between the model predictions are more pronounced.
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Figure 13. Generator reliability parametric model stratified hazard function values, Full Model
and Simplified Model
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V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The data acquired for this study revealed a sample population with fewer operational
failures and much higher reliability than was anticipated from prior research. The sample
population was found to have maintenance practices falling loosely into two stratified
subpopulations, each with a large degree of homogeneity. The maintenance of Department of
Defense units differed with some respects, but were still largely maintained following
Department of Defense standards with monthly load tests and frequent maintenance intervals.
The contractor-maintained generator sets were also largely homogenous with nearly every unit
receiving an automated weekly no-load test and a contractor visit with a periodicity of one to six
months. Nearly all units received what could be categorized as good, very good, or excellent
maintenance, and failure rates were lower than anticipated. Statistically significant relationships
with reliability could not be determined for all predictors.
Two predictors stood out as the most highly significant, the log of generator age log(Tage)
and the log of generator cumulative run hours log(Trftv). These predictors both exhibit Weibull
base hazard rate characteristics in the parametric proportional hazards model and suggest
generator sets experience elevated infant mortality levels but become more reliable with age,
although less reliable at higher run hours.
Interim model test results and data analysis suggested a high degree of conflation existed
between many of the maintenance and test predictors within the sample population. The interim
model test results also suggested conflation between several maintenance and test predictors and
generator set size and load. The most significant predictors in the interim models were battery
resistance or impedance test x12, check electrical tightness x16, data source xsrc, and generator load
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xL. Investigation of the data found x12 and x16 were largely conflated with each other and also
with xsrc. When paired together in a single model, x12 and x16 yielded nearly equal and opposite
coefficients. Two new predictors were created to be generic analogues of the most frequent touch
maintenance periodicity of any type x23 and most frequent test periodicity of any type x24, but
neither of these predictors were found to be significant. However, the associated training
predictors xb23 and xb24 were found to be significant, but only when analyzed independently of
the maintenance and test periodicity predictors. This was unexpected as these predictors were
intended to exclusively be interaction modifiers to the maintenance and test predictors, and not
standalone predictors, but the statistical significance as a standalone predictor in the regression
suggested the presence of a staff subject-matter expert performing tasks at any periodicity
increased reliability compared to collateral duty staff or subject-matter expert site visits. No
statistically significant difference was noted between collateral duty staff and subject-matter
expert site visits, but all sites in the sample population with collateral duty staff also relied
heavily on subject-matter expert site visits, so this lack of difference may reflect conflation
between these two predictors and not equivalence.
Deeper analysis revealed a very high level of conflation between xb23, xb24, xsrc and
electrical tightness x16, with all reflecting high significance in interim models. Maintenance
predictor x16 is related to re-torqueing lug bolts on the main electrical conductors as these
connections can loosen over time. While no failures related to electrical tightness were reported,
the only sites that reported performing electrical tightness checks were those with had full-time
subject-matter experts on staff, and the periodicity of x16 appeared to correlate generally with the
intensity of maintenance from those staff subject-matter experts. For this reason, and the high
significance of x16 in the models and high quality of the model including x16, predictor x16 was
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selected as the analogue predictor to represent the general quality of maintenance and testing in
lieu of xb23, xb24, xsrc, or any other maintenance or test predictor.
The interim regression models discussed in this section are included in Appendix B.

HYPOTHESIS TESTS RESULTS
Generator set reliability was found to be representable as a function of generator set age,
run hours, and other maintenance and test predictors. The null hypothesis Ho0 was therefore
rejected for the primary research question in favor of the alternate hypothesis H a0 that
maintenance periodicity, test periodicity, training, make, model, size, age, run time, or load have
an impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability.
Predictors log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) were found to be highly significant. It can be stated with
a high level of confidence that there is a relationship between generator set age and generator set
reliability and that there is a relationship between generator set run hours and generator set
reliability; the null hypotheses Ho4 and Ho5 were rejected. Predictors x12, x13, x16, x17, x18, xb23,
xb24, xkW, xxl and xsrc each returned significant results in interim models, but there is a degree of
conflation evident between these predictors. Due to this conflation, it cannot be stated with
complete confidence from the results of the statistical analysis alone what the individual
relationship of these predictors was with generator set reliability, but there was sufficient
evidence to reject the null hypothesis for maintenance periodicity H o1 and to include x16 in the
final model as the collective analogue for maintenance. Sufficient evidence was found to reject
the null hypothesis for test periodicity Ho2, but a test predictor specific to test periodicity could
not be explicitly included in the model due to conflation.
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The regression results of interim models suggested the possibility of a relationship
between generator size, load, make, and model, but such relationships may also be due to
conflation. As no evidence was found to clearly demonstrate such relationships, the result of the
null hypotheses test of Ho3, Ho6, Ho7, and Ho8 is failure to reject.
The hypothesis tests results are summarized in Table 7.

Table 7. Hypothesis Test Results Summary
Ho0

Ho1
Ho2
Ho3
Ho4
Ho5
Ho6
Ho7
Ho8

Null Hypothesis
Maintenance periodicity, test periodicity, training, make,
model, size, age, run time and load have no impact on
emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability.
Maintenance periodicity has no impact on emergency dieselelectric emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability.
Test periodicity has no impact on emergency diesel-electric
generator set reliability.
Size has no impact on emergency diesel-electric emergency
generator set reliability.
Age has no impact on emergency diesel-electric emergency
generator set reliability.
Cumulative chronometer run-hours have no impact on
emergency diesel-electric generator set reliability.
Load has no impact on emergency diesel-electric generator set
reliability.
Training of servicing personnel has no impact on emergency
diesel-electric generator set reliability.
Make and Model have no impact on emergency diesel-electric
generator set reliability.

Result
Reject

p-Test
p = 0.00002

Reject

p = 0.047

Reject

See Text

Fail to reject

p > 0.10

Reject

p = 0.00002

Reject

p = 0.0067

Fail to reject

p > 0.10

Fail to reject

p > 0.10

Fail to reject

p > 0.10

HYPOTHESIS Ho1 TEST RESULTS
The null hypothesis was rejected for maintenance periodicity H o1. The maintenance
predictor x16 was selected with coefficient β16 = 0.240 for the final model at a significance of
p = 0.047, which meets the α ≤ 0.10 criteria for significance. Maintenance predictors x12, x13, x17,
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and x18 and were found to be significant at α ≤ 0.10 in interim models, but there was a degree of
conflation evident between these predictors and predictors xb23, xb24, kW, xl and xsrc that made
determining the specific relationship of each predictor difficult. The significance of predictors
kW, xL and xsrc are discussed in detail in subsequent paragraphs, but are believed to be significant
in the interim regression models only due to a degree of conflation with significant maintenance
predictors. None of the maintenance predictors were significant in combination with each other.
Predictor x16 had the highest significance in the interim models and yielded the most significant
mode and was thus selected to be a general analogue reflecting the conflated maintenance
predictors x12, x13, x16, x17, and x18 and training predictors xb23 and xb24. Predictor x16 was viewed
as generally reflecting the intensity and quality of maintenance efforts, and not specifically
related to electrical tightness.

HYPOTHESES Ho2 TEST RESULTS
The null hypothesis was rejected for test periodicity Ho2 due to observations made during
data acquisition. The most significant test periodicity predictor for dead-bus operational tests β22
yielded p = 0.101 in one interim model, suggesting some significance but falling just beyond the
criteria for statistical significance. Load test on operational load β21 yielded p = 0.106 in one
interim model, suggesting some significance for this test periodicity as well, but also falling just
beyond the criteria for significance. Load testing on a load bank β20 yielded p = 0.157 in one
interim model and no-load testing β19 yielded p = 0.306 in another interim model. Conflation
with other model predictors and subpopulation homogeneity is suspected to have contributed to
the regression interim model results as the indications of negative test correlation of no-load tests
and load bank tests runs counter to other observations made during this research.
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The regression results may be a Type II error from insufficient data to determine a
statistically significant relationship between test periodicity and reliability for the frequently
tested and very frequently tested generator sets in the sample population, and the absence of
available data from infrequently tested generator sets. Test failures were not requested or
collected during data acquisition, but much larger numbers of test failures than operational
failures were observed in historic records during data acquisition indicating that a positive
correlation between test frequency and reliability would likely have been found had frequent
tests not been conducted on these units, a correlation not visible in the regression results. A
review of a portion of maintenance records acquired for this research covering a subpopulation
of 225 standby-years of operation for units receiving weekly no-load tests and contractor
maintenance visits every six months revealed fourteen test failures and three operational failures,
a ratio of 4.7:1 of test to operational failures, and an annual reliability of 92% with test failures
included. This is consistent with reliability levels reported by prior research that included test
failures and operational failures in the reliability calculations. The small-scale data set of Fehr
(2014) found eight test failures and two test failures in 126 standby-years of records, a ratio of
4:1 of test to operational failures, and 94% reliability for well-maintained units with test failures
included. PREP (TM 5-605-5) reported 88% annual reliability for a mix of well, average, and
poorly-maintained units, but PREP did not make a distinction between test and operational
failures.
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HYPOTHESES Ho3 TEST RESULTS
The predictors for generator set size and data source were included in the model only to
test the assumption that this model can be generalized to generator sets of different size and
ensure that the source of the data was not a source of bias.
Generator set size and data source were both found to be statistically significant in
interim regression models with p = 0.094 and p = 0.039 respectively, but neither was significant
when combined in a model with predictor x16. These results are believed to be due to conflation
with x16 and several other predictors due to stratification in the sample population. However, the
results cannot be separated out and tested independently to verify these assumptions due to the
conflation.
Despite the inconclusive statistical results, inductive reasoning suggests that the
relationship with generator size and source in the interim models was a Type 1 error from
conflation with the subpopulation and not a direct cause. Therefore, this work fails to reject the
null hypothesis that generator set size impacts reliability, but additional research is required to
quantitatively support the assumption that this model is generalizable to different size generator
sets.

HYPOTHESES Ho4 TEST RESULTS
Regression analysis suggests a statistically significant relationship between the log of
emergency diesel-electric generator set age log(Tage) and reliability of βage = -1.476, with a
significance of p = 0.000018, and thus the null hypothesis is rejected. This relationship exhibits a
Weibull base hazard rate. The shape parameter mage of the Weibull base hazard rate can be
calculated as mage = βage + 1 = -0.476. The negative coefficient suggests a relationship of infant
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mortality and higher reliability of older generator sets. This predictor was the most significant
predictor in the model by two orders of magnitude and persisted with high significance in nearly
every interim model suggesting a low level of conflation with other predictors and a high
indication of independence.

HYPOTHESES Ho5 TEST RESULTS
Regression analysis suggests a statistically significant relationship between the log of
emergency diesel-electric generator set cumulative run hours log(Trtfv) and reliability of
βrtfv = 0.700, with a significance of p = 0.0067, and thus the null hypothesis is rejected. This
relationship exhibits a Weibull base hazard rate. The shape parameter mrtfv of the Weibull
distribution can be calculated as mrtfv = βrtfv + 1 = 1.700. The positive coefficient greater than one
suggests a wear-out distribution. Although the coefficients for age and run hours were offsetting
for much of the sample population, statistically significant relationships between reliability and
age and reliability and run hours persisted in interim models even when only one or the other
predictor was present, indicating the offset coefficients are a result of different effects and not
conflation.

HYPOTHESES Ho6 TEST RESULTS
Generator set load presented a challenge to hypothesis testing, as xL was significant in
interim models when included as the only time-independent predictor, but lost significance when
paired with the other most significant predictors, x16, x12, and xsrc. The coefficients suggest
conflation of generator set load xL with x12, x16, and xsrc. The conflation is explained by data
stratification within the sample population. Most sites in the sample population that performed
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regular tightness tests x16 and battery resistance or impedance tests x12 performed regular load
tests at typical station load, but most sites in the sample population that did not regularly perform
these maintenance steps performed no-load testing. Where load information was unavailable but
generator sets were reported to receive weekly no-load tests, typical load xL was approximated as
0 kW. Figure 14 shows a bubble chart with the data distribution comparing x16 and xL and
reflects the negative correlation of x16 and xL.; the size of the bubbles in this chart reflect the
histogram data. Figure 14 depicts 299 records, 251 of which are at x16 = 7 and xL = 0 kW. All
but two of the operational failures occurred in units receiving regular no-load testing at 0 kW
load and no tightness testing, but xL values were biased by the assumption of 0 kW typical load.
These units presumably supported load during utility power failures and should more accurately
be reflected as operating at an average of something greater than 0 kW, but accurate load
information was not reported for most of the units and thus is biased in the methodology. While
xL is one of the most statistically significant results, the existence of bias and lower quality data
suggests these results may be a Type 1 error. For this reason, xL was excluded from the final
model and the null hypothesis test deemed to be a failure to reject.
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Figure 14. Generator set load and x16 bubble chart. The size of the bubble reflects the number of
records at each axis point.

HYPOTHESES Ho7 TEST RESULTS
The null hypothesis for training Ho7 was rejected as the training predictors xb23 and xb24
were both significant in interim models for staff subject-matter experts with a significance of
p = 0.078, which meets the α ≤ 0.10 criteria for significance. There was no significance in the
regression models distinguishing between staff collateral duty and service visit subject-matter
expert (contractor) test and maintenance. These results were highly conflated with maintenance
predictors x12, x13, x16, x17, and x18 and predictors kW, xl and xsrc, making individual analysis
difficult.
The training predictors xbi were intended by Fehr (2014) for inclusion in the model only
as interaction terms to determine of the training level of technicians performing various test and
maintenance actions had significance. No training modifier xbi was found to have any
significance in any interim model as an interaction with a test or maintenance predictor xi;
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however, the aggregated training predictor for maintenance xb23 and the aggregated training
predictor for tests xb24 were both unexpectedly found to have significance in interim models as
standalone predictors.
Predictors xb23 and xb24 were factors with three categories: staff subject-matter expert,
staff collateral duty, and subject-matter expert service visit. The latter, subject-matter expert
service visits, were all third-party contractors in the sample population. There was no statistically
significant distinction found between staff collateral duty and service visit subject-matter expert,
but there was a statistically significant difference between these two factors and staff subjectmatter expert. A new investigatory predictor xb25 was created as a factor with two categories:
staff subject-matter expert, and not staff subject-matter expert. This predictor was found to have
higher significance and higher model quality than either xb23 or xb24. Predictor xb25 was also found
to be nearly fully conflated with electrical tightness test predictor x16, as only sites with staff
subject-matter experts performed this maintenance action, and the periodicity at which sites
performed this action appeared to correlate not simply with this action, but the intensity of
maintenance and testing periodicity in general. This hidden correlation with maintenance rigor
may explain why predictor x16 was found to have such a high significance despite no reported
failures in the sample population related to electrical tightness. As the presence of maintenance
personnel is meaningless without action, maintenance predictor x16 must still represent
maintenance actions, but it also appears to be a better analogue for training than any of the
training predictors included in the study.
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HYPOTHESES Ho8 TEST RESULTS
The analysis of the sample population suggests no statistically significant relationship
between emergency diesel-electric generator set make (MAKE) or model (MODEL) factors, with
p > 0.10 in all interim regression models, resulting in a failure to reject the null hypothesis. The
complexity of the emergency diesel-electric generator set market made this criterion difficult to
evaluate as different manufacturers outsource engines and generators from different companies
utilizing different engine manufacturers for different model units. Different makes often source
the same engine or generator, and mergers and acquisitions and licensing agreements have
blended different makes under different marques. While many technicians offered unsolicited
opinions on various marques during this research, no statistically significant difference was
found between any make or model. However, this lack of statistically significant difference
between makes or models may represent Type II error and does not prove there is no difference
in reliability between different makes or models, only that this work failed to reject the null
hypothesis. When all makes and models were condensed into nine marques, Caterpillar,
Cummins, Onan, MTU, Empire, Generac, SDMO, Olympian, and Kohler, little significance was
found.
The regression, included in Appendix B, compared each marque to Caterpillar, but only
two marques were found to have statistically significant differences, Olympian and Onan, with
p = 0.075 and p = 0.085 respectively, both with positive coefficients indicating reduced
reliability compared to Caterpillar. Olympian is a Caterpillar brand of 30kW-200kW generator
sets manufactured at different times by Caterpillar and under license by Generac (Generac
Corporation v. Caterpillar, 1999), so there may be some conflation here due to either generator
size or size stratification in the sample population. Onan was bought by Cummins in 1986 and
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Onan products are produced by Cummins Power Generation (Cummins, 2017). Cummins
manufactures small diesel-electric generator sets under the Onan name, as well as large
generators coupled to Cummins-branded engines. Several larger generator sets in the sample
population were recorded as Onan, but may be referring to Onan generators coupled to Cummins
engines, so it remains difficult to determine if Onan performance differs significantly from the
others.
Combining Olympian with Caterpillar and Onan with Cummins and re-running the
regression resulted in MTU becoming statistically significant with a negative coefficient and
p = 0.036, a marked change from the significance of p = 0.427 in the regression when Olympian
and Onan were considered separate marques. Like Caterpillar and Cummins, MTU owns
multiple makes including Detroit Diesel and Katolight, which were included under the MTU
marque for this analysis. The large change between the two regressions casts doubt on whether
MTU is more reliable than the other marques or the second result is Type I error.
Given the differences between the two regressions and potential for Type I error through
random chance, the significant regression results for Olympian, Onan, and MTU are insufficient
evidence to reject the null hypothesis or to void the assumption that this research is generalizable
across many different makes and models of modern low-emissions emergency diesel-electric
generator sets.
If this finding is a Type II error and there is a difference between the reliability of
different makes, it’s likely modest, as large differences in reliability should have been detected
by this methodology. There is also potential for bias between makes related to market share of
different makes in different size ranges and applications, and the potential for increased
managerial attentiveness and prioritization on large premium units as compared to inexpensive
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smaller units. Additional research is required to validate the assumption of generalizability and
determine if there is a relationship between generator make and reliability.

DISCUSSION
By regression analysis, the reliability of emergency diesel-electric generator sets was
found to be representable by a parametric proportional hazards model with exponential and
Weibull base hazard rates. This model includes an exponential base hazard rate λ, an infantmortality Weibull base hazard rate based on generator set age log(Tage), a wear-out Weibull base
hazard rate based on generator set cumulative chronometer run hours log(Trtfv), and a covariate
predictor x16 that regression and analysis suggests to be an analogue represents the general
intensity of maintenance and testing.
Five of the twenty-two test and maintenance predictors were found to have significance
in various interim regression models included in Appendix B, but these test and maintenance
predictors were found to be highly conflated with each other and with generator set size and
load. These seven predictors attained offsetting coefficients and lost significance when applied in
any combination in models, indicating a level of conflation. Much of this conflation was found to
be due to common stratifications and subpopulation homogeneity in the sample population.
Further investigation into the sample population revealed the highest significance maintenance
and test predictor, electrical tightness testing x16, appear to be related to the general intensity and
rigor of maintenance. The most reliable generator sets in the sample population were those
maintained by staffs of full-time generator technicians that performed intensive maintenance like
x16 at very frequent intervals. Predictor x16 appears to have become significant in the model
simply because it was one of the few predictors with a large variance within the sample
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population and thus was more sensitive to very small differences in generator set reliability
between the subpopulations. The regression results and analysis suggest that predictor x16 is
highly representative of the general intensity of maintenance within the sample population.
The regression analysis of emergency diesel-electric generator set data revealed
statistically significant relationships with age and run hours suggesting generators become more
reliable with age, but less reliable at higher run hours. The relationship between reliability and
generator set age has the strongest significance relationship in the model with p = 0.000018. The
shape parameter mage of the Weibull base hazard rate can be calculated as
mage = βage + 1 = -0.476. The negative coefficient suggests a relationship of infant mortality and
higher reliability of older generator sets. That generators become more reliable with age is at first
counter-intuitive, but this funding seems to reflect the statistical impact of infant mortality and
shows that well-maintained generator sets do not exhibit wear-out characteristics based on age
alone. This research suggests the operational life of older generator sets with good maintenance
and repair support may be extended with little risk. However, reliability is not the only parameter
that matters, and operational availability of units is a function of mean time to repair. Retirement
of units of any age may be prudent when spare parts and maintenance support are no longer
available or units incur excessive time to repair.
The model also reflects generator sets with greater run-hours as being less reliable, which
follows logic, as machinery of this sort exhibits wear characteristics and nearly identical
generator sets in prime-power generation applications are well known to wear out from use. The
mean annual run-time of generator sets in this study was 31.2 hours per year, which results in an
interesting parity; the infant mortality of log(Tage) was found to dominate the model the first five
years in service, but is largely offset by log(Trtfv) for much of the remaining life. The relationship
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of cumulative run hours to reliability was found to be highly statistically significant with
p = 0.0067.
The shape parameter mrtfv of the log(Trtfv) Weibull base hazard rate can be calculated as
mrtfv = βrtfv + 1 = 1.700. The positive coefficient suggests a wear-out relationship which
generators of greater run-hours exhibiting reduced reliability. The mode of this pattern is
important for failure prediction and determination in the statistically optimal retirement date for
units with high hours, but the mode unfortunately cannot be determined directly from the
regression results, as the λ value from the regression represents the sum of the contributions from
the base exponential distribution, the log(Tage) Weibull parameters and log(Ttrfv) Weibull
parameters. Without the ability to extract the specific λ contribution of each piece, the predictive
power of this portion of the model is limited. One manufacturer representative who did not wish
to be cited said his company expects their longest-lived model of emergency generator set to be
completely overhauled every 11,000 hours and replaced after 22,000 hours of use. The typical
generator set in this study would take 32 years to accumulate 1000 hours and even the most used
generator set in this study only accumulated 4680 hours. Only generator sets in areas with
exceptionally poor-quality utility power or operated in duty cycles other than emergency duty
could experience this many hours before replacement. It would take 110 years for an emergency
generator set to reach 22,000 hours at the ISO 8528-1 (2005) maximum rated 200 hours per year.
No statistically significant relationships were found in the data for make, model, size, or
load, but insufficient power was realized to conclude the absence of these relationships due to the
limited amount of data. Likewise, confirmation could not be confidently made that there were no
interactions between these predictors and other maintenance and test predictors. Some of the
interim models suggest there may be some dependencies; however, any particularly strong
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dependencies would be expected to be clear despite the limited data. Further, the absence of such
results in the model and the large numbers of predictors involved suggest the significant results
in some interim models were more likely from Type I error than actual relationships. Some terms
were included in the regression to avoid reliance upon testable a priori assumptions, but
similarities in technology and construction of generator sets in this size range permits the a priori
assumption to be made that the reaction to maintenance will be similar for all makes and models
of generator sets of the size range in this study. This assumption permits treating the sample
population as a single population and permits drawing additional conclusions from the data
without the need for make, model, or size covariates.
When the parametric model results were compared to the sample MTBF from the data,
the model results appeared to slightly over-estimate the effect on reliability of maintenance, with
the model over-predicting the reliability of units receiving high intensity maintenance by 0.6%
but under-predicting the reliability of units receiving lower intensity maintenance by 0.6%. The
difference between the sample MTBF and model suggests there may be influence from other
sources not included in this model. This was unsurprising considering the amount of conflation
between x16 and other predictors within the sample population and the imprecision of x16 in
representing all test and maintenance for these generator sets. The significance of this predictor
in the statistical models and effect size strongly suggests a relationship between emergency
diesel-electric generator set reliability and the maintenance and test intensity. While there may be
some error and uncertainty in the model results, there was enough evidence conclude that
maintenance and testing have an impact on generator set reliability. This knowledge can be used
to aid managers in determining the appropriate intensity of maintenance and testing for their
generator sets and for systems engineers calculating emergency power system reliability.
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This research initially sought to develop a general model to quantitatively determine the
optimal level of test and maintenance periodicity for emergency diesel-electric generator sets.
More generally speaking, however, the model was a means to an end, and the true intention was
to develop recommendations for managers to improve the performance of emergency power
systems supporting critical operations facilities and other facilities requiring highly reliable
emergency power. The optimal periodicity of NFPA 110 (2016) maintenance and test predictors
cannot be precisely determined from this data, but the significant relationship in this data
strongly suggests that more intensive maintenance and testing yields higher reliability than less
intensive maintenance and testing. The sample subpopulation with full-time subject-matter
experts on staff and the highest intensity maintenance had the highest operational reliability and
an observed failure rate of 1.647% per year. The sample population receiving outsourced
maintenance also had high operational reliability, much higher than previous studies (Hale &
Arno, 2009; IEEE 493-2007), but the observed failure rate for the lower intensity subpopulation
was about 2.85 times higher than the higher intensity subpopulation, at 4.695% per year. The
new knowledge from this work will help managers make staffing and maintenance and testing
decisions. There is a roughly order of magnitude cost difference going from outsourced
maintenance to a full-time staff, so the decision is not necessarily an easy one.
One concern mentioned multiple times by technicians during data acquisition and by
sources such as Loehlein (2007) is that frequent no-load tests damage engines and cause wetstacking, a condition where cylinder and exhaust temperatures are insufficient to achieve
complete diesel combustion, resulting in deposits in the cylinder and a build-up of unburnt diesel
fuel in the exhaust system. The only record was reviewed during data acquisition with a failure
attributed to wet-stacking was a 10kW unit at a police station that did not receive regular load
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testing, only weekly no-load testing, and may have had another attributable cause such as very
low load during emergency operation. This was one of the smallest generator sets in the sample
population and no other generator sets in this study were reported to have any failures or serious
problems related to wet stacking or low-load operation, although a few units not regularly tested
under load were found during maintenance to show signs that wet stacking was occurring. NFPA
110 (2016) recommends, and in some cases requires, monthly load tests with ATS transfer and
annual load-bank tests for units that operate below 30% load and do not achieve adequate
exhaust temperature during these tests. Tufte (2014) recommended limiting loads below 30% to
no more than 8 hours before loading the generator set at minimum 50% load. Tufte (2014) found
that while older generator sets and early low-emissions units were highly susceptible to wetstacking, the newest generation of generator sets can run at much lower levels for longer periods
before running into wet stacking or similar low-load problems and can run up to 8 hours at below
10% load and 24 hours below 30% load before running above 50% load is necessary. None of
the units in the sample population receiving monthly operational load tests were reported to have
any issues related to wet stacking.
NFPA 110 (2016) does not require regular no-load tests, and Cummins recommends noload tests be held to a minimum (Loehlein, 2007). However, technicians at the Cummins factory
could not recall any of their newest engines suffering from wet-stacking when asked, and noload tests are required by Caterpillar to perform certain preventative maintenance checks
(Caterpillar, 1997; Caterpillar, 2010a; Caterpillar, 2010b; Caterpillar, 2010c; Caterpillar, 2010d).
There are some negative effects on diesel engines from running at low load, but these negative
effects are largely neutralized by running periodically at higher loads (Tufte, 2014).
Additionally, large numbers of hidden failures were discovered during regular no-load tests that
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likely would have resulted in operational failures had those no-load tests not been conducted.
Thirty-minute weekly no-load tests will accumulate twenty hours per year in addition to the
monthly load tests required by NFPA 110 for certain applications. Similar increases in run hours
were found by the regression to result in a statistical increase in failure rate. However, the
relationship found between run-hours and reliability is logarithmic and the hazard rate increases
only slightly with an additional twenty hours of run time per year. This is a very small impact
compared to the contribution of maintenance and test intensity on overall generator set
reliability. This analysis suggests the benefits of no-load testing are greater than the incurred
wear or negative effects, and a test plan with regular weekly no-load tests and monthly load tests
with ATS transfer will result in an overall increase in generator set reliability.
Another important consideration is that tests are intended to detect hidden failures so they
can be quickly corrected, but tests must be monitored to be useful. Numerous incidents were
recorded in logs of automatic no-load tests failing but going unnoticed for weeks or months
because nobody noticed or reported the test failure. In one instance, a generator set in a remote
portion of a university campus suffered a controller failure and ran for 23 days at idle until it ran
dry of oil and catastrophically seized, requiring replacement. If the scheduled weekly testing of
this unit had been monitored, it would likely still be in service. In other instances, alarms
reported to technicians could not be replicated or troubleshot, and the result was that multiple
failures occurred before the prudent corrective maintenance action could be completed. If
technicians had been on-site during the first test that exhibited problems, corrective maintenance
actions may have been more quickly taken and problems corrected. Other issues such as the
potential for oil and coolant leaks increase the risk of unmonitored testing causing environmental
problems. Unmonitored automatic tests can also fail to detect frequency oscillations (hunting),
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mild overheating, squealing belts, bearing noise, or other indications of pending failures that
would not necessarily result in an alarm. The benefit of no-load tests is reduced and risk is
increased if exercisers automatically run no-load tests without active monitoring. All tests should
be actively monitored to achieve maximum benefit.
This study did not directly investigate operational availability, but it was recognized that
no-load test failure alarms going un-noticed for months would yield much lower availability than
no-load test failures that received prompt response. The data acquired for this study primarily
consisted of logs recorded by subject-matter experts and did not include information on local
monitoring of no-load tests, making it difficult to determine how quickly automatic no-load test
failures were detected and responded to with appropriate corrective action. Some of the higher
failure rates of the units receiving automatic no-load tests and less frequent visits by servicing
personnel may have been biased by lack of monitoring. Sites were recorded as performing noload tests if the exerciser was configured, but if nobody was monitoring those tests, much of the
benefits of these tests were lost. As these sites were included in the regression as if they were
performing regular no-load tests, the bias would result in a model that underestimates the
reliability of generator sets receiving regular monitored no-load tests.

GENERALIZABILITY
The purpose of this research was to develop a general model for determining the
reliability and optimal test and maintenance periodicities for emergency diesel-electric generator
sets supporting critical operations facilities and other facilities requiring highly reliable
emergency power, but with the intent of creating a general model applicable to all emergency
diesel generator sets between 60 kW and 2.5 MW electrical capacity and of the characteristics
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described in the system subcomponents section of the introduction. As data was readily available
for a number of units in the 10 kW to 60 kW size range and the decision to delimit to 60 kW was
arbitrary, the regression analysis was expanded to cover units 10 kW to 2.5 MW. No statistically
significant evidence was found during the regression analysis of the sample population to
indicate a lack of generalizability of this model across this size range.
The pre-hoc power analysis predicted that a sample size of 1142 standby-years including
141 operational failures would achieve adequate power at α = 0.1 and β = 0.2. The sample
population included 1281 standby-years of generator set data from 239 generator sets, capturing
58 operational failures in 40,161 run-hours of operation. As the sample population proved to be
more reliable than anticipated during pre-hoc power analysis, insufficient operational failures
were observed to achieve adequate power at α = 0.1 and β = 0.2. No statistically significant
relationship was found between reliability and generator set make, model, or size. However, due
to data failing to achieve the predicted power for this study, the absence of evidence of a
relationship between reliability and generator set make, model, or size is insufficient statistical
evidence to conclude the absence of such relationships without an unacceptable risk of Type 2
error.
Other methods were attempted to test generalizability of the model within the sample
population including sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis removing all the small units from
the sample population revealed little change to regression results. The sensitivity analysis tested
various intentionally biased models where portions of the population were removed, new failures
were introduced, and failures were removed. None of the sensitivity analysis tests resulted in
large changes to any significant model parameter, which suggested relationships in the final
model are robust and the model is insensitive to noise and random chance in the data.
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Present maintenance guidance (NFPA 110, 2016) does not make distinctions based on
make, model, or size and there are reasonable arguments for this assumption supported by many
technicians (Walbolt, 2010). Fehr (2014) made a general a priori assumption that generator sets
of make, model, and size within the delimitations of this research represent a common population
with a common response to maintenance. Given this rationale and the lack of evidence to the
contrary, it is appropriate to continue the a priori assumption of generalizability of make, model,
and size from the Fehr (2014) framework and extend the generalizability of this model to all
emergency diesel generator sets between 10 kW and 2.5 MW electrical capacity with of the
characteristics described in Chapter I. This can also be extended to apply to spark ignition natural
gas-powered generator sets based on modified diesel engines as these engines are identical in
nearly every way to diesel engines, and no evidence was found in this study that natural gas and
diesel engines responded differently to NFPA 110 maintenance.

LIMITATIONS
The Cox (1972)-based regression failed to calculate the specific contribution of each of
the twenty-two maintenance and test predictors. Although 1281 standby-years of generator set
data from 239 generator sets was acquired for this data, only 58 operational failures were
captured, fewer than the 141 failures anticipated to yield statistically significant results at
α = 0.10 and β = 0.20 by Hsieh and Lavori (2007) methods. This was likely exacerbated by a
lack of diversity in the sample population which consisted largely of Department of Defense and
contractor-maintained commercial units being maintained in accordance with Department of
Defense policies and standard commercial practices. The sample population included very few
units that varied significantly from NFPA 110 (2016) recommendations and included very few
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units that received no regular tests or poor maintenance, data essential to teasing significant
results from generator sets that have been found to be far more reliable in practice than previous
research suggested. The lack of available data on poorly-maintained units further reduced the
realized normalized covariate variance σ2 used in the Hsieh and Lavori (2007) power
calculations to estimate the amount of data required for this research.
The Fehr (2014) framework relied upon several common characteristics of emergency
diesel-electric generator sets to work including a large data pool, diversity of maintenance
practices, and good records. While there was some diversity of maintenance practices, the
sample population included a large degree of stratification and conflation, making it difficult to
discern statistically significant results with the available data. To better differentiate the impact
of test and maintenance periodicity, more data must also be drawn from units of average and
poor-quality maintenance.
Insufficient data prevented the support of generalizability of this model by statistical
power analysis. Make, model, and size were not found to have statistical significance, but the
risk of Type II error exceeds the threshold of β = 0.20 due to the higher than expected reliability
of the sample population and relative homogeneity of maintenance. While the reliability model
developed herein is believed to be generalizable to all models of diesel-electric generator sets
within the size range of 10 kW to 2.5 MW in emergency service, this belief requires an a priori
assumption.
Another limitation of this research is that it was restricted to NFPA 110 (2016)
recommended maintenance with periodicity of one year or less. Maintenance such as engine
overhauls, battery replacement, thermostat replacement, and block heater replacement were not
investigated, but numerous failures related to these items were discovered during data
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acquisition. The choice to focus on maintenance with recommended periodicity of one year or
less was made to reduce the scope of this study to a reasonable length observation period and is
consistent with NFPA 110 (2016) recommended practice, but as such, this study is unable to
measure the effectiveness of maintenance actions with longer periodicity. Future research should
be extended to include such additional maintenance items.

AVAILABILITY CALCULATIONS
A secondary objective of this framework was to use the data to calculate the availability
of generator sets with varying level of maintenance for inclusion into the US Army Corps of
Engineers Power Reliability Enhancement Program (PREP) database and future editions of TM
5-698-5 (2006), NFPA70B (2016), and IEEE 493 (2007). This would allow engineers to better
design emergency generator systems to meet availability requirements and allow managers to
make well informed risk decisions when planning maintenance. This research has produced the
reliability model in Equation 14, but was unable to produce calculations of inherit availability Ai
or operational availability Ao, as repair time data was not collected, nor was data collected on
unavailability periods due to scheduled preventative maintenance or corrective maintenance
following test failures. While the operational reliability statistics determined by this research can
be used to estimate operational reliability based on generator set age, run hours, and maintenance
for the purposes of engineering calculations, similar estimations of availability will require
additional research.
Previous research estimated inherent availability for emergency diesel-electric generator
sets as Ai = 0.999712 for well-maintained generator sets (Fehr, 2014) and Ai = 0.9974 for a
general population of generator sets including well, average, and poorly-maintained units (TM 5-
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698-5, 2006). This order of magnitude disparity between prior research findings on availability
and these new research findings on reliability suggest the availability of well-maintained units
and poorly-maintained units may differ by a large degree and use of PREP availability numbers
is likely highly conservative for well-maintained generator sets.
Mean time to repair (MTTR) will differ between sites as well. Previous research
estimated MTTR as 18.3 hours (TM 6-698-5, 2006). This MTTR was pooled from an average of
well, average, and poorly-maintained generator sets. PREP did not publish information on
staffing at these facilities, but it can be inferred that a site with full time subject-matter experts on
staff and well-stocked inventories of spare parts on-site will have a shorter mean time to repair
than sites that experience contracting, travel, and shipping delays. Sites that fail to monitor noload generator tests might have effective MTTR measured in weeks as failures may not be
noticed until the next scheduled maintenance.
Another complication is the difficulty in determining the time between the occurrence of
hidden failures and subsequent repair as only the time of discovery of the failure is typically
known, not the point where the failure occurred. For example, it may not be known when a
starter battery died, for instance, only that the unit did not start the next time it was attempted.

OTHER APPLICATIONS
The survival regression technique discussed herein using a Cox (1972) proportional
hazards model to simultaneously combine multiple exponential and Weibull relationships as
predictors is believed to have a wide number of applications for describing complex machinery
and other populations exhibiting survival distributions based upon multiple independent base
hazard rates. These statistical modeling methods can be calculated using standard coxreg and
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coxph statistical modeling packages in the R libraries eha and survival (Broström, 2011) or other
statistical packages that use Cox regression algorithms. This survival regression technique could
be directly applied to empirical research into transformer statistical lifetime modeling similar to
the simulated modeling of Zhou, Wang, and Li (2014), or to any number of complex machinery
where the lack of such methods to account for time dependent properties necessitated
assumptions of exponential relationships (Moubray, 1997; Hale & Arno, 2009). This type of
model could potentially also be used to better represent populations presently represented by
pure Weibull failure modes but that are also subject to unrelated random failures like lightning
strikes and accidents.
The Fehr (2014) framework for this research has other potential uses as well. While this
framework was developed to provide a means of determining optimal maintenance of emergency
diesel-electric generator systems, the Fehr (2014) methodology would apply equally well to
create general models for other high-reliability systems that, due to a combination of low failure
rates and the censorship actions of preventative maintenance, are difficult to analyze with
conventional failure modes and effects analysis techniques. This framework could be adapted to
analyze system subcomponents as well as whole systems. Potential applications of these
techniques include uninterruptible power supply systems; heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning systems; maritime shipping industry systems; military applications; aviation
industry systems, and others.
This framework is most effective where the data pool is large compared to the failure
rate, where maintenance practices vary, where training of maintenance crews vary, where good
records are maintained in a consistent fashion, and where the units have been in service long
enough to develop a history. For example, this framework may work well to compare failure
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rates of similar models of military aircraft in service at different organizations that receive
different maintenance practices or utilize different training. This includes widely produced and
internationally sold aircraft such as the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon, the Sukhoi Su27, Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) such as the General
Atomics MQ-1 Predator and Boeing Insitu ScanEagle.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS

Diesel-electric generator sets in emergency standby duty receiving average or better
levels of maintenance were found to have significantly higher operational reliability than
previous research (Fehr, 2014; TM 5-698-5, 2006) indicated. The Fehr (2014) framework was
successfully applied to perform Cox (1972) regression and piecewise constant hazard model
analysis on 1281 standby-years of generator set data from 239 generator sets with 58 operational
failures in 40,161 run-hours to develop a parametric Cox proportional hazards model with
exponential and Weibull base hazard rates representing generator set reliability as a function of
age, run hours, and maintenance intensity. This model can be used to estimate the reliability of
generator sets of various age, run hours, and maintenance intensity.
This research found that generator sets exhibited characteristics of multiple survival
distributions including exponential random failure, Weibull wear-out, and Weibull infant
mortality. The regression model found generator sets in this study suffered elevated failure rates
in the first few years after installation but become more reliable as they aged. This result was
unexpected, but was a highly statistically significant finding with p = 0.000018. The model also
found generator sets became less reliable as cumulative run hours increased, offsetting much of
the age-related increase in reliability for units near the near 31.2 hours annual run hours in the
sample population. Statistical significance for run hours was also very high at p = 0.0067. These
highly significant results provide confidence that the Weibull log(Tage) and log(Trtfv) relationships
are representative of the population and not a result of Type I error. The regression failed to
return information that will allow precise estimates of the optimal periodicity of all NFPA 110
(2016) recommended maintenance and test predictors, but the regression found the intensity of
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maintenance has a very strong effect on generator set reliability with a significance of p = 0.047.
This research found that common commercial maintenance plans with weekly no-load generator
tests and monthly, bi-monthly, or quarterly maintenance achieve mean annual reliability levels
higher than 96% for well-established units with typical run hours. This modeling further shows
that sites with full-time staffs of subject-matter experts and highly intense maintenance plans can
reduce the rate of operational failures by another 66-80%, achieving greater than 99% annual
operational availability for similar generator sets.
The maintenance predictor for check electrical tightness x16 was found to function as an
analogue for the general intensity of maintenance and testing for the final model, and it was the
most significant maintenance or test predictor at p = 0.0067. Several other maintenance
predictors showed some statistical significance in some interim models, but the individual
contribution of each of these predictors could not be determined due to conflation and
stratification in the data, and statistical significance was lost when these predictors were included
together in any combination in other interim models. The predictor x16 was found to be heavily
conflated with predictors for the personnel conducting the most frequent touch maintenance xb23
(staff subject-matter expert vs. subject-matter expert site visit), data source xsrc, and maintenance
periodicities for battery resistance or impedance test x12, clean unit exterior x13, engine intensive
maintenance x17 and generator electrical intensive maintenance x18. Interpretation of this finding,
guided by the statistical significance of each predictor and other associated knowledge, is that x16
represented not just checks for electrical tightness, but the general intensity of all maintenance.
Sites in the sample population with large subject-matter expert staffs performing the shortest
periodicity tests had the shortest periodicity of x16 while sites with contract maintenance did not
perform maintenance x16 at all. Intensity cannot be quantified as specific periodicities of each test
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and maintenance predictors, but the relationship can be estimated by a categorization as average,
high, and extremely high maintenance intensity represented respectively by x16=7 years, x16=1
year, and x16=1/12 year. In this context, average maintenance refers to generator sets receiving
weekly automatic no-load tests and contractor site visits with a periodicity of one to six months.
Highly intensive maintenance refers to sites adhering to NFPA 110 (2016) requirements and
generator sets receiving weekly maintenance and monthly load tests with ATS transfer.
Extremely high intensity maintenance refers to sites well exceeding NFPA 110 requirements
with daily maintenance, weekly load tests, and intensive monthly maintenance. The only sites in
this study receiving extremely high intensity maintenance were critical operations power system
facilities with large full-time on-site staffs of generator technicians, electricians, and mechanics
tasked exclusively with maintenance and operation of a small number of emergency dieselelectric generator sets and uninterruptible power supply systems.
No statistically significant evidence was found that contradicts the a priori assumption
that generator set make, model, or size within the range in this study have no significant impact
to reliability or the related assumption that this research can be generalized to all diesel-electric
generator sets 10 kW to 2.5 MW in emergency duty operating fewer than 200 hours per year. It
was sought to confirm this assumption quantitatively to increase confidence, but there was
insufficient data to do so.
A regression technique combining exponential and Weibull distribution components was
successfully used with standard Cox (1972) regression functions coxreg and coxph in the
Survival package for R. This technique included time dependent covariate predictors for age and
cumulative run hours in the regression analysis in the form log(T), which is mathematically
equivalent to a Weibull base hazard rate. This technique permitted straightforward Cox
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regression of multiple exponential and Weibull relationships simultaneously. A weakness was
found in the unavailability of parametric regression tools to complete the analysis; the phreg
function in the Survival package in R accurately estimated regression coefficients but was unable
to properly fit the model due to the inability of the function to treat time dependent variables as
both static and time dependent in different portions of the algorithm. Utilizing piecewise constant
hazard (PCH) modeling in Microsoft Excel to fit the model to empirical subpopulation reliability
calculations permitted development of a parametric model, but this modelling could be improved
with adaptation of R functions that can better handle time dependent variables. As logarithmic
functions become asymptotic as the limit approaches zero, the PCH model was calculated with
one-year cuts starting at year one.
The shape parameter of constituent Weibull distribution components within the combined
model can be directly calculated from the β coefficients returned by the regression, but the scale
parameter returned by the regression cannot be easily separated from the scalar h0 which contains
the product of the baseline exponential distribution λ and all other Weibull scale parameters in
the model. Overall model performance is unimpacted, as h0 still contains all these coefficients,
but not knowing what the scale parameter values are prevents direct calculation of the Weibull
distribution modes or other predictions that would be useful for better understanding system
performance over time.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The reliability of diesel-electric generator sets in emergency standby applications should
be calculated by engineers and managers using Equation 19 as a function of generator set age,
run hours, and maintenance intensity, where maintenance intensity is 7 for average, 1 for high,
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and 0.0833 for very high. Reliability tables are provided in Appendix C for average, high, and
extremely high intensity maintenance of generator sets at different ages and run hours. The
reliability tables in Appendix C reflects the findings of this research that generator reliability is
not static over time, and that new generator sets are statistically less reliable than generator sets
that have been in service for ten or more years.

0.00885𝑒 (𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) (𝑅𝑢𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠)0.7
ℎ (𝑡 ) =
(𝐴𝑔𝑒)1.476

(19)

The model developed by this research predicts generator sets will become more reliable
as they age, but this does not necessarily mean generator sets should remain in service
indefinitely, as reduced availability of spare parts and qualified maintenance personnel for older
units may increase time to repair and decrease operational availability to unacceptable levels and
necessitate generator set replacement based on obsolescence. Managers should consider
extending the life of generator sets with low cumulative run hours and plan replacement based on
criteria other than just age. Other options such as refurbishment or replacement of obsolete
ancillary components may be the most optimal solution for some aging generator sets. Changing
emissions requirements or other local requirements may also play a role.
One of the questions originally driving this research was whether no-load tests are
beneficial or harmful to generator set reliability from the additional wear from testing and risk of
wet stacking. Test failure data was not specifically investigated in this research, but a review of a
subpopulation receiving weekly no-load tests revealed 82% of total failures were found during
testing, all of which would likely have resulted in an operational failure during the next outage
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had those tests not occurred. The only evidence of wet-stacking reported in the generator sets of
this sample population were in a small number of units that did not receive any regular load tests
or transfer tests. Only one unit was reported to have suffered a failure related to wet stacking, but
this unit may have had another attributable cause. No generator sets also conducting monthly
transfer load tests were reported to have any evidence or symptoms of wet stacking. Other
research has found the effects of wet stacking are minimal in the latest generation of generator
sets and mitigated on all diesel engines by regularly running under load (Tufte, 2014).
Conducting weekly no-load tests in addition to monthly transfer load tests will incur an addition
twenty run-hours of no-load tests per year, a rate that has only a small negative impact to longterm generator reliability due to the logarithmic relationship between cumulative chronometer
run hours and generator reliability.
All managers interested in improving emergency generator set reliability should conduct
weekly monitored no-transfer tests and monthly load tests with automatic transfer switch
transfer. The no-transfer tests may be no-load tests or load bank tests for sites configured with
load banks. These tests should not be conducted by automatic exerciser, but should be manually
initiated and monitored by qualified personnel to reduce the time to repair and increase the
likelihood that problems will be discovered, and corrective actions taken. Even monitoring of
tests by minimally trained site personnel has advantages over unmonitored automatic tests. Such
tests also give personnel an opportunity to gain and maintain proficiency in generator set
operation. NFPA 110 (2016) should be updated to require weekly no-transfer tests for legally
required units and should clarify that mandatory tests must be monitored. All generator sets
receiving regular no-load tests should also receive monthly load tests, even if not required to by
NFPA 110. Typical generator set load during normal operation should be maintained above 10%
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of rated load for the newest units and above 30% of rated load for older units, as it is important
to ensure damage from low-load operation does not occur. Periods of up to eight hours at low
loads should be followed by loading the units to at least 50% (Tufte, 2014). Legally required
generator sets must be loaded to a minimum 30% per NFPA110 (2016) during the required
monthly load test with ATS transfer.
Generator sets utilizing contract subject-matter expert site visits yielded very high
reliability, but the highest reliability levels were at facilities with staff subject-matter experts
conducting generator set maintenance and tests at much more frequent intervals than required by
NFPA 110 (2016). Generator sets receiving such extremely high intensity maintenance were
found to have 66-80% fewer operational failures than sites receiving average levels of
maintenance. While full time staffs may not be financially viable or justifiable for all facilities,
full time staffs or highly intensive contracts should be considered for sites where failure has
catastrophic consequences.
The United States Army Corp of Engineers’ Power Reliability Enhancement Program
(PREP) should update TM 5-698-5 (2006), NFPA should updated NFPA 70B (2016), and IEEE
should update IEEE 493-2007 (2007) to reflect the impact of maintenance intensity, age, and run
hours on generator set operational reliability. Additional research is needed to better determine
emergency generator set availability based on maintenance, testing, age, and run hours.
Additional investigation should also be made into the applicability of the Fehr (2014)
methodology for the reliability of uninterruptible power supply systems; heating, ventilation, and
air conditioning systems; maritime shipping industry systems; military applications; aviation
industry systems; and other complex systems which share similar traits of maintenance-censored
failure data and diverse maintenance practices for similar or identical equipment.
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Survival models using a Cox proportional hazards model with exponential and Weibull
base hazard rates were developed with relative ease by software implementing Cox regression
techniques and described emergency diesel-electric generator sets better than more traditional
models assuming a single survival distribution. This survival distribution technique including
Weibull components as logarithmic covariate predictors should be considered for other systems
whose overall survival distribution may be best represented as a combination of multiple
independent distributions. Better software tools should be developed to enable better
development of non-parametric regression models with time dependent covariates.
Lastly, the research herein should be continued until sufficient data is acquired to
quantitatively determine specific optimal test and maintenance periodicities. This research
should be expanded to contain test failures and times to repair so that availability can be
investigated with similar rigor.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDICES
SURVEY FORM

Generator Test and Maintenance Study
Fl eet Cyber Comma nd/Comma nder Tenth Fl eet i s conducti ng a s tudy on the i mpa ct of tes t a nd ma i ntena nce i nterva l s on the rel i a bi l i ty of
modern hi gh-effi ci ency di es el -el ectri c genera tor s ets . As ma nufa cturers ’ preventa ti ve ma i ntena nce recommenda ti ons di ffer s i gni fi ca ntl y,
a nd often contra di ctory dependi ng on whi ch ma nufa cturer repres enta ti ve or document you reference, a ctua l i mpl ementa ti on ha s va ri ed
wi del y. Thi s pres ents us a n opportuni ty to revi ew your l ogs a nd s ci enti fi ca l l y determi ne the benefi t of more frequent tes ts a nd preventa ti ve
ma i ntena nce. Thi s s tudy wi l l s ha pe future FCC/C10F pol i cy for tes t a nd ma i ntena nce frequency.
Pl ea s e compl ete thi s s urvey a nd ema i l i t to Steve Fehr, FCC/C10F power engi neer, a t s tephen.fehr@na vy.mi l . FCC/C10F comma nds s houl d
cons i der thi s a da ta ca l l ; other orga ni za ti ons (publ i c or pri va te) a re encoura ged to pa rti ci pa te, a s the more da ta we ha ve, the better thi s
s tudy wi l l be. Res ul ts of the s tudy wi l l be provi ded to a l l who pa rti ci pa te. Sens i ti ve i nforma ti on wi l l not be s ha red.

POINT OF CONTACT INFORMATION
Name*
Email*
Phone*
Organization*
Date
* This information is for contact purposes only

UNIT INFORMATION Please submit a separate form for each genset.
Site Name*
Generator Name ("#1" etc)
Genset Make
Genset Model
Genset kW/kVA Rating
Genset Installation Date**
* This information will not be shared outside of US Navy. ** This study is
looking primarily at "modern" emergency diesel generator sets
manufactured after 1990.

REPORTING PERIOD Please submit a separate form for each period*.
Start date of reporting period
End date of reporting period
Run hours at start of reporting period
Run hours at end of reporting period
Number of starts
Typical operational loads (%)
* Please report as many years of service as you have records for. Each
reporting period should cover a single genset over a period of consistent
maintenance and testing. If maintenance or test procedures or frequency
changed, please submit a separate form. For instance, if a genset installed
in 1998 changed from weekly to monthly testing in 2004, 1998-2004 is one
reporting period, and 2004-2014 is another.
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Routine Maintenance Frequency

Service Visit SME
Staff SME
Collateral Duty
Unknown
N/A
Not Routine
More than 3 year
3 year
2 year
Annual
6-month
Quarterly
Monthly
Biweekly
Weekly
Daily
40hr/week watch
24/7 watch

ROUTINE PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE

Done by

Contractor service visit(s); details not known
Check alarms
Check switch & breaker positions
Visual inspection for leaking fluids
Visual inspection of hoses, cables, etc.
Check fuel level
Check oil level
Check coolant level
Check air filter
Battery voltage & physical condition
Check fan belt(s)
Battery resistance or impedance test
Clean unit exterior (including radiator & louvers)
Fuel cleaning (or fluid analysis)
Oil change (or fluid analysis)
Check electrical tightness
Engine intensive maintenance
Generator (electrical) intensive maintenance

Test Frequency

service visit SME
in-house SME
collateral duty
Unknown
N/A
Not routine
More than 3 year
3 year
2 year
Annual
6-month
3-month
Monthly
Biweekly
Weekly
Daily
40hr/week watch
24/7 watch

ROUTINE TESTING

Done by

Generator set no-load test
Generator set load test on load bank
Generator set load test on operational load
"Dead bus" operational load test
Form Version 9DEC13

OTHER COMMENTS Any information that might help us properly interpret your data, such as information about unit damage, special
maintenance, corrosive climate, etc., as well as any other information not covered on this form that may be pertinent to the study. If historic logs
were low on detail, or had to be reproduced by memory, please note that here.
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Operational Failure
Test Failure
Failure while running
Failure to start

Date of
Failure

Time to repair (hrs)

You do not need to report corrective maintenance (repairs) discovered early and repaired
to prevent a failure from occuring; this section should be used to list events that actually
resulted in a failure to start or failure while running. For failures while running, please
include how long the genset was running prior to failure. If details of the failure are
unknown, enter as much as is known; check the box(es) and leave the rest blank if that's all
you know.

Run hours at failure

DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE Briefly describe what failed. Expand this field if needed.

135
APPENDIX B
REGRESSION OUTPUT

COX REGRESSION TIME ANALYSIS, x16 FULL TIME-DEPENDENT MODEL
The following output is from R during analysis of the data set by time (t) and operational
failure events (Fov). The predictors are as defined in Table 1. This utilized data set “g41r” which
represents the final data set reduced by the removal of units that lacked run-hour chronometers.
Time at start (T2s), was used to represent time at the start of the observation period and was set as
T2s = 0 for all observations. T2ey represents time (in years) accumulated during each observation
period as T2ey = (Tfv - Tsv)/365. This model was the culmination of the bidirectional stepwise
regression process described in Chapter 4 and represents the final non-parametric model. Plots
for this model are shown in Figure 15 through Figure 19.

> fit <- coxreg(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x16, data =
g41r)
> summary(fit)
Call:
coxreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
x16, data = g41r)
Covariate
log(Tagey)
log(Trtfv)
x16

Mean
2.499
5.888
6.273

Events
Total time at risk
Max. log. likelihood
LR test statistic
Degrees of freedom
Overall p-value

Coef
-1.476
0.700
0.240
58
1281.3
-269.94
24.2
3
2.27095e-05

> cox.zph(fit)
rho chisq
p
log(Tagey) -0.1099 0.7528 0.386
log(Trtfv) 0.0412 0.0907 0.763
x16
-0.0837 0.4160 0.519
GLOBAL
NA 1.5785 0.664

Rel.Risk
0.229
2.014
1.271

S.E.
0.344
0.258
0.121

Wald p
0.000
0.007
0.047
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plot(survfit(fit),ylab="prob(Survival)",xlab="Years in Standby Service")
plot(resid(fit))
plot(cox.zph(fit)[1])
plot(cox.zph(fit)[2])
plot(cox.zph(fit)[3])
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Figure 15. Survival fit of full model regression by time in standby service, h(t).
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Figure 16. Martingale residuals of full model regression fit by time in standby service, h(t).
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Figure 17. Schoenfeld residuals of cox.zph fit test for log(Tage), full model by time

Figure 18. Schoenfeld residuals of cox.zph fit test for log(Trtfv), full model by time
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Figure 19. Schoenfeld residuals of cox.zph fit test for x16, full model by time
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COX REGRESSION RUN HOURS ANALYSIS, x16 FULL TIME DEPENDENT MODEL
The following output is from R during analysis of the data set by run hours (Trt), and all
operational failure events (Fov). This utilized data set “g41r” which represents the final data set
reduced by the removal of units that lacked run-hour chronometers. Time at start (T2s), was used
to represent run hours at the start of the observation period and was set as T2s=0 for all
observations. T3e represents the run hours accumulated during each observation period as
T3e=Trtfv-Trtsv. This model was the culmination of the bidirectional stepwise regression process
described in Chapter 4. As no covariates were significant in this model and the log likelihood of
this model strength weak compared to the model by time, this model was dropped from the
analysis. The survival fit is shown in Figure 20.
> fit <- coxreg(Surv(T2s, T3e, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x16, data = g
41r)
> summary(fit)
Call:
coxreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T3e, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
x16, data = g41r)
Covariate
log(Tagey)
log(Trtfv)
x16

Mean
2.458
6.098
6.342

Events
Total time at risk
Max. log. likelihood
LR test statistic
Degrees of freedom
Overall p-value

Coef
-0.240
-0.396
0.155

Rel.Risk
0.787
0.673
1.168

S.E.
0.324
0.293
0.118

Wald p
0.460
0.176
0.187

58
40151
-265
13.5
3
0.00365329

> cox.zph(fit)
rho chisq
p
log(Tagey) 0.0808 0.357 0.5499
log(Trtfv) -0.1779 2.255 0.1332
x16
-0.2524 3.800 0.0512
GLOBAL
NA 5.849 0.1192
> plot(survfit(fit),ylab="prob(Survival)",xlab="Run Hours")
> plot(survfit(fit.x16.c),ylab="prob(Survival)",xlab="Years in Standby Servic
e")
> plot(resid(fit))
> plot(cox.zph(fit)[1])
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Figure 20. Survival fit of full model regression by run hours, h(Trt)
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COX REGRESSION TIME ANALYSIS, x16 SIMPLIFIED MODEL
The following output is from R during analysis of the data set by time (t) and all failure
events (Fv). The predictors are as defined in Table 1. This utilized data set “g41r” which
represents the final data set reduced by the removal of units that lacked run-hour chronometers.
Time at start (T2s), was used to represent time at the start of the observation period and was set as
T2s = 0 for all observations. T2ey represents time (in years) accumulated during each observation
period as T2ey = (Tfv - Tsv)/365. This model removed the time dependent Weibull predictors from
the full model. Plots for this model are shown in Figure 21 through Figure 23.

> fit.x16.c <- coxreg(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r)
> summary(fit.x16.c)
Call:
coxreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r)
Covariate
x16

Mean
6.273

Events
Total time at risk
Max. log. likelihood
LR test statistic
Degrees of freedom
Overall p-value

Coef
0.199

Rel.Risk
1.220

S.E.
0.115

Wald p
0.084

58
1281.3
-279.75
4.57
1
0.0325215

> cox.zph(fit.x16.c)
rho chisq
p
x16 -0.1 0.541 0.462
> plot(survfit(fit.x16.c),ylab="prob(Survival)",xlab="Years in Standby Servic
e")
> plot(resid(fit.x16.c))
> plot(cox.zph(fit.x16.c)[1])
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Figure 21. Survival fit of simplified model regression by time in standby service, h(t)

Figure 22. Martingale residuals of simplified model regression fit by time in standby service, h(t)
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Figure 23. Schoenfeld residuals of cox.zph fit test for x16, simplified model by time
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COX REGRESSION RUN HOURS ANALYSIS, x16 SIMPLIFIED MODEL
The following output is from R during analysis of the data set by run hours (Trt), and all
operational failure events (Fov). This utilized data set “g41r” which represents the final data set
reduced by the removal of units that lacked run-hour chronometers. Time at start (T2s), was used
to represent run hours at the start of the observation period and was set as T2s=0 for all
observations. T3e represents the run hours accumulated during each observation period as
T3e=Trtfv-Trtsv. This model removed the time dependent Weibull predictors from the full model.
Plots are shown in Figure 24 through Figure 26.

> fit.x16.c <- coxreg(Surv(T2s, T3e, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r)
> summary(fit.x16.c)
Call:
coxreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T3e, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r)
Covariate
x16

Mean
6.342

Events
Total time at risk
Max. log. likelihood
LR test statistic
Degrees of freedom
Overall p-value

Coef
0.200

Rel.Risk
1.221

S.E.
0.117

Wald p
0.087

58
40151
-269.54
4.43
1
0.0353569

> cox.zph(fit.x16.c)
rho chisq
p
x16 -0.227 2.92 0.0876
> plot(survfit(fit.x16.c),ylab="prob(Survival)",xlab="Years in Standby Servic
e")
> plot(resid(fit.x16.c))
> plot(cox.zph(fit.x16.c)[1])
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Figure 24. Survival Fit of simplified model regression by run hours, h(t)

Figure 25. Martingale residuals of simplified model regression fit by run hours, h(t)
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Figure 26. Schoenfeld residuals of cox.zph fit test for x16, simplified model by run-hours
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COX REGRESSION TIME ANALYSIS, INTERIM TIME-DEPENDENT MODELS
The following output is from R during analysis of the data set by time (t) and all
operational failure events (Fov). The predictors are as defined in Table 1. This utilized data set
“g41r” which represents the final data set reduced by the removal of units that lacked run-hour
chronometers. Time at start (T2s), was used to represent time at the start of the observation period
and was set as T2s = 0 for all observations. T2ey represents time (in years) accumulated during
each observation period as T2ey = (Tfv - Tsv)/365. The interim models in this section show models
with combinations of the predictors with the highest statistical significance in model
development, x12, x16, xL and src.
Alone in combination with log(Tage) and log(Trtfv), x12, x16, xL and src all yield highly
significant results.

> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x12, data = g41r)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
x12, data = g41r)
coef exp(coef) se(coef)
z
p
log(Tagey) -1.479
0.228
0.345 -4.29 1.8e-05
log(Trtfv) 0.703
2.020
0.258 2.72 0.0065
x12
0.217
1.242
0.110 1.97 0.0484
Likelihood ratio test=23.9 on 3 df, p=2.58e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x16, data = g41r)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
x16, data = g41r)
coef exp(coef) se(coef)
z
p
log(Tagey) -1.476
0.229
0.344 -4.29 1.8e-05
log(Trtfv) 0.700
2.014
0.258 2.71 0.0067
x16
0.240
1.271
0.121 1.99 0.0469
Likelihood ratio test=24.2 on 3 df, p=2.27e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + xl, data = g41r)
Call:
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coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
xl, data = g41r)
coef exp(coef) se(coef)
z
p
log(Tagey) -1.53743
0.21493 0.35433 -4.34 1.4e-05
log(Trtfv) 0.74718
2.11103 0.26519 2.82 0.0048
xl
-6.02614
0.00241 3.22697 -1.87 0.0618
Likelihood ratio test=25.8 on 3 df, p=1.05e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + src, data = g41r)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
src, data = g41r)
coef exp(coef) se(coef)
z
p
log(Tagey) -1.494
0.224
0.347 -4.31 1.7e-05
log(Trtfv) 0.708
2.031
0.261 2.72 0.0066
srcB
1.537
4.651
0.744 2.07 0.0389
Likelihood ratio test=24.6 on 3 df, p=1.84e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58

When placed in combination, x12, x16, xL and src all lost statistical significance and the
model significance worsened. There were no models where two or more of these predictors
remain significant together. The opposite coefficients in these paired models suggest conflation
is impacting the regression results.

> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x12 + x16 + xl + src
, data = g41r)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
x12 + x16 + xl + src, data = g41r)
coef exp(coef)
log(Tagey) -1.47e+00 2.30e-01
log(Trtfv) 6.94e-01 2.00e+00
x12
-4.04e+01 2.74e-18
x16
4.17e+01 1.23e+18
xl
-5.85e+00 2.88e-03
srcB
2.26e+01 6.57e+09

se(coef)
z
p
3.57e-01 -4.11 4e-05
2.73e-01 2.54 0.011
1.43e+04 0.00 0.998
1.27e+04 0.00 0.997
4.25e+00 -1.38 0.169
9.19e+04 0.00 1.000

Likelihood ratio test=29.1 on 6 df, p=5.94e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58
Warning message:
In fitter(X, Y, strats, offset, init, control, weights = weights,
Loglik converged before variable 3,4,6 ; beta may be infinite.

:
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> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x12 + x16, data = g4
1r)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
x12 + x16, data = g41r)
coef exp(coef)
log(Tagey) -1.39e+00 2.48e-01
log(Trtfv) 6.23e-01 1.86e+00
x12
-4.29e+01 2.36e-19
x16
4.84e+01 1.03e+21

se(coef)
z
p
3.47e-01 -4.02 5.9e-05
2.63e-01 2.36
0.018
1.19e+04 0.00
0.997
1.34e+04 0.00
0.997

Likelihood ratio test=26.3 on 4 df, p=2.76e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58
Warning message:
In fitter(X, Y, strats, offset, init, control, weights = weights,
Loglik converged before variable 3,4 ; beta may be infinite.

:

> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x16 + xl, data = g41
r)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
x16 + xl, data = g41r)
coef exp(coef) se(coef)
z
p
log(Tagey) -1.53516
0.21542 0.35320 -4.35 1.4e-05
log(Trtfv) 0.75149
2.12016 0.26532 2.83 0.0046
x16
0.07402
1.07682 0.14233 0.52 0.6030
xl
-4.86990
0.00767 3.84834 -1.27 0.2057
Likelihood ratio test=26.1 on 4 df, p=3e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x16 + src, data = g4
1r)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
x16 + src, data = g41r)
coef exp(coef) se(coef)
z
p
log(Tagey) -1.49375
0.22453 0.34708 -4.30 1.7e-05
log(Trtfv) 0.70838
2.03070 0.26063 2.72 0.0066
x16
0.00979
1.00984 0.46795 0.02 0.9833
srcB
1.47827
4.38535 2.90636 0.51 0.6110
Likelihood ratio test=24.6 on 4 df, p=5.96e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58

> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x12 + xl, data = g41
r)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
x12 + xl, data = g41r)
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coef exp(coef) se(coef)
z
p
log(Tagey) -1.53675
0.21508 0.35335 -4.35 1.4e-05
log(Trtfv) 0.75194
2.12110 0.26534 2.83 0.0046
x12
0.05786
1.05956 0.13056 0.44 0.6577
xl
-5.04269
0.00646 3.85424 -1.31 0.1908
Likelihood ratio test=26 on 4 df, p=3.13e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x12 + src, data = g4
1r)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
x12 + src, data = g41r)
coef exp(coef) se(coef)
z
p
log(Tagey) -1.494
0.224
0.347 -4.31 1.7e-05
log(Trtfv) 0.706
2.025
0.261 2.70 0.0069
x12
-0.260
0.771
1.065 -0.24 0.8074
srcB
3.260
26.047
7.228 0.45 0.6520
Likelihood ratio test=24.8 on 4 df, p=5.66e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58
> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + xl + src, data = g41
r)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
xl + src, data = g41r)
coef exp(coef) se(coef)
z
p
log(Tagey) -1.53433
0.21560 0.35334 -4.34 1.4e-05
log(Trtfv) 0.74907
2.11504 0.26569 2.82 0.0048
xl
-4.69266
0.00916 4.06455 -1.15 0.2483
srcB
0.48335
1.62150 0.94431 0.51 0.6088
Likelihood ratio test=26.1 on 4 df, p=3.01e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58

Dataset g41r4 was created with a new Marque factor which sorted the myriad of makes
and models cluttering the original Make factor into nine specific marques, Caterpillar, Cummins,
Onan, MTU, Empire, Generac, SDMO, Olympian, and Kohler. Dataset g41r5 reduced this
further by incorporating Onan into the Cummins parent brand and Olympian into the Caterpillar
parent brand. SDMO and Kohler were left separate in all models.
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> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x16 + Marque, data =
g41r4)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
x16 + Marque, data = g41r4)
coef exp(coef)
log(Tagey)
-1.65e+00 1.91e-01
log(Trtfv)
6.10e-01 1.84e+00
x16
1.87e-01 1.21e+00
MarqueCummins
7.70e-01 2.16e+00
MarqueEmpire
-1.36e+01 1.25e-06
MarqueGenerac
1.18e-01 1.12e+00
MarqueKohler
4.06e-01 1.50e+00
MarqueMTU
-6.39e-01 5.28e-01
MarqueOlympian 1.16e+00 3.18e+00
MarqueOnan
1.14e+00 3.12e+00
MarqueSDMO
9.48e-02 1.10e+00

se(coef)
z
p
3.51e-01 -4.71 2.4e-06
2.70e-01 2.26
0.024
1.28e-01 1.46
0.144
6.36e-01 1.21
0.226
2.62e+03 -0.01
0.996
6.32e-01 0.19
0.852
6.51e-01 0.62
0.533
8.05e-01 -0.79
0.427
6.50e-01 1.78
0.075
6.59e-01 1.73
0.085
9.23e-01 0.10
0.918

Likelihood ratio test=38.9 on 11 df, p=5.43e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58
Warning message:
In fitter(X, Y, strats, offset, init, control, weights = weights,
Loglik converged before variable 5 ; beta may be infinite.

:

> coxph(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) + x16 + Marque, data =
g41r5)
Call:
coxph(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ log(Tagey) + log(Trtfv) +
x16 + Marque, data = g41r5)
log(Tagey)
log(Trtfv)
x16
MarqueCummins
MarqueEmpire
MarqueGenerac
MarqueKohler
MarqueMTU
MarqueSDMO

coef exp(coef)
-1.51e+00 2.21e-01
5.76e-01 1.78e+00
2.68e-01 1.31e+00
2.10e-01 1.23e+00
-1.44e+01 5.74e-07
-5.80e-01 5.60e-01
-3.21e-01 7.25e-01
-1.36e+00 2.57e-01
-6.04e-01 5.46e-01

se(coef)
3.41e-01
2.63e-01
1.22e-01
3.65e-01
2.60e+03
4.11e-01
4.54e-01
6.47e-01
7.85e-01

z
p
-4.43 9.5e-06
2.19
0.029
2.19
0.028
0.58
0.564
-0.01
0.996
-1.41
0.158
-0.71
0.479
-2.10
0.036
-0.77
0.442

Likelihood ratio test=34.9 on 9 df, p=6.1e-05
n= 299, number of events= 58
Warning message:
In fitter(X, Y, strats, offset, init, control, weights = weights,
Loglik converged before variable 5 ; beta may be infinite.

:
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PARAMETRIC MODEL SPREADSHEET REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The parametric model could not be analyzed by the R function phreg due to the different
time dependencies required for predictor coefficient calculations and final model fitting. The
parametric model was instead developed by piecewise constant hazard regression in Microsoft
Excel.
The final parametric model below was developed by separating the sample population
into two stratified subpopulations, one with x16 = 7 and one with x16 ≤ 1. Different values of λ
were selected until the difference between the weighted reliability mean of the model matched
the sample reliability from the data. The mean value of x16 = 0.45 for the x16 ≤ 1 subpopulation
was used to represent x16 for the x16 ≤ 1 subpopulation. The histogram field was used for
weighting the mean and represents the number of observations of generator sets of that age
included in the sample population data set.

The piecewise constant hazard model spreadsheet equations used were as follows, with T
representing the age of the generator set from T = 1 to 43 years, the oldest set in the sample
population. The calculated values are shown in Table 8 and Table 9.

h(t) = $B7*EXP($C7+$D7+$E7) = λe-1.476log(T) + .7log(31.2T) + 0.1044 [or 1.624 for x16=7]
f(t) = I7*L6 = h(t)S(t-1)
F(t) = K6+J7 = f(t) + F(t-1)
S(t) = EXP(-K7) = e-F(t)
R(t) = EXP(-I7) = e-h(t)
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Table 8. Model Parameter Calculations From the Spreadsheet Regression for x16 ≤ 1
x16<=1
t(years)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

h(t)
x 16 ≤ 1
0.023061915
0.018257634
0.015925737
0.014454185
0.013407065
0.012608071
0.011969796
0.011443075
0.010997746
0.010614092
0.010278577
0.009981545
0.009715888
0.009476236
0.009258442
0.009059242
0.008876028
0.008706685
0.008549474
0.008402954
0.008265915
0.008137334
0.008016338
0.00790218
0.00779421
0.007691865
0.007594652
0.007502137
0.007413938
0.007329714
0.007249162
0.007172012
0.007098019
0.007026965
0.006958652
0.006892899
0.006829545
0.006768439
0.006709446
0.006652442
0.006597312
0.006543951
0.006492262

f(t)
PDF
0.023062
0.017841
0.015287
0.013664
0.012502
0.011611
0.010896
0.010304
0.009801
0.009367
0.008987
0.008649
0.008346
0.008073
0.007824
0.007596
0.007386
0.007191
0.007011
0.006843
0.006685
0.006537
0.006398
0.006267
0.006143
0.006025
0.005913
0.005807
0.005705
0.005608
0.005515
0.005427
0.005342
0.00526
0.005182
0.005106
0.005033
0.004963
0.004896
0.00483
0.004767
0.004706
0.004647

F(t)
CDF
0.023062
0.040903
0.056191
0.069855
0.082358
0.093969
0.104865
0.115169
0.12497
0.134338
0.143324
0.151973
0.160319
0.168391
0.176215
0.183811
0.191196
0.198388
0.205399
0.212242
0.218927
0.225464
0.231862
0.238129
0.244272
0.250297
0.25621
0.262016
0.267721
0.273329
0.278845
0.284271
0.289613
0.294873
0.300055
0.305161
0.310194
0.315158
0.320053
0.324884
0.329651
0.334357
0.339004

S(t)
Surv
0.977202
0.959922
0.945359
0.932529
0.920943
0.910311
0.900446
0.891215
0.882523
0.874295
0.866473
0.859012
0.851872
0.845023
0.838438
0.832093
0.82597
0.820052
0.814322
0.808769
0.803381
0.798146
0.793055
0.788101
0.783275
0.77857
0.77398
0.769499
0.765121
0.760842
0.756657
0.752562
0.748553
0.744626
0.740778
0.737005
0.733304
0.729674
0.72611
0.722611
0.719175
0.715798
0.712479

R(t)
Rel Histogram
0.977202
6
0.981908
7
0.9842
8
0.98565
11
0.986682
7
0.987471
10
0.988102
10
0.988622
10
0.989063
10
0.989442
6
0.989774
4
0.990068
4
0.990331
2
0.990569
2
0.990784
5
0.990982
9
0.991163
7
0.991331
8
0.991487
8
0.991632
9
0.991768
9
0.991896
0
0.992016
0
0.992129
1
0.992236
1
0.992338
1
0.992434
1
0.992526
0
0.992613
0
0.992697
0
0.992777
0
0.992854
3
0.992927
3
0.992998
3
0.993066
3
0.993131
3
0.993194
3
0.993254
3
0.993313
3
0.99337
0
0.993424
0
0.993477
0
0.993529
0
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Table 9. Model Parameter Calculations From the Spreadsheet Regression for x16 =7.
x16 =7
t(years)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

h(t)
x 16 = 7
0.1054021
0.083444629
0.072786935
0.06606136
0.061275607
0.057623887
0.054706716
0.052299391
0.050264063
0.048510611
0.046977175
0.045619621
0.044405464
0.043310158
0.042314751
0.04140433
0.04056697
0.039793003
0.039074488
0.038404832
0.037778509
0.037190843
0.036637846
0.036116096
0.03562263
0.035154873
0.034710571
0.034287743
0.033884637
0.0334997
0.033131546
0.032778938
0.032440763
0.032116018
0.031803799
0.031503285
0.031213729
0.030934451
0.030664831
0.030404299
0.030152333
0.029908452
0.029672214

f(t)
PDF
0.105402
0.075097
0.060766
0.0519
0.045705
0.041061
0.037414
0.034454
0.031992
0.029904
0.028105
0.026537
0.025154
0.023924
0.022822
0.021827
0.020924
0.0201
0.019344
0.018648
0.018005
0.017409
0.016854
0.016336
0.015852
0.015398
0.014971
0.014569
0.014189
0.01383
0.013491
0.013168
0.012862
0.01257
0.012293
0.012028
0.011775
0.011533
0.011301
0.011079
0.010866
0.010662
0.010466

F(t)
CDF
0.105402
0.180499
0.241266
0.293166
0.338871
0.379932
0.417347
0.451801
0.483793
0.513697
0.541803
0.568339
0.593494
0.617418
0.64024
0.662067
0.68299
0.70309
0.722434
0.741082
0.759087
0.776496
0.79335
0.809686
0.825538
0.840936
0.855907
0.870476
0.884665
0.898496
0.911986
0.925154
0.938016
0.950586
0.962879
0.974907
0.986681
0.998214
1.009515
1.020594
1.031461
1.042123
1.052588

S(t)
Surv
0.899963
0.834853
0.785633
0.745899
0.712574
0.683908
0.658793
0.636481
0.616441
0.59828
0.581699
0.566465
0.552394
0.539335
0.527166
0.515784
0.505104
0.495053
0.485569
0.476598
0.468093
0.460015
0.452327
0.444998
0.437999
0.431307
0.424898
0.418752
0.412852
0.407182
0.401726
0.39647
0.391404
0.386514
0.381792
0.377228
0.372812
0.368537
0.364396
0.360381
0.356486
0.352705
0.349033

R(t)
Rel Histogram
0.899963
45
0.919942
76
0.929799
84
0.936073
99
0.940564
98
0.944005
95
0.946763
97
0.949045
82
0.950978
75
0.952647
66
0.954109
60
0.955405
55
0.956566
46
0.957614
37
0.958568
35
0.959441
32
0.960245
34
0.960988
31
0.961679
31
0.962323
28
0.962926
20
0.963492
20
0.964025
14
0.964528
13
0.965004
13
0.965456
11
0.965885
11
0.966293
11
0.966683
9
0.967055
8
0.967411
7
0.967752
7
0.96808
4
0.968394
4
0.968697
3
0.968988
2
0.969268
2
0.969539
2
0.969801
2
0.970053
2
0.970298
1
0.970534
1
0.970764
1
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The weighted reliability of each subpopulation was calculated by the equation below,
where n(t) is the histogram value for each year.

𝑅𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 =

∑43
𝑡=1 𝑅 (𝑡 )𝑛(𝑡)
∑43
𝑡=1 𝑛(𝑡)

This was compared to the observed sample reliability, calculated as Rdata = e-1/MTBF,
where MTBF = Total Time / Number of Failures for the sample population.

For x16 ≤ 1, MTBF = 143.77 / 2 = 71.88 years
For x16 = 7, MTBF = 1137.45 / 56 = 20.3116 years

A value of λ = 0.00696 resulted in the smallest net difference between the model and data
reliability figures.

ℎ(𝑡) = 0.00696𝑒 0.240𝑥16 −1.476 log(𝑡)+.700log(31.2𝑡)

For x16 ≤ 1, Rdata = 0.95305, Rmodel = 0.94703
For x16 = 7, Rdata = 0.98353, Rmodel = 0.98956
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SIMPLIFIED PARAMETRIC REGRESSION MODEL ANALYSIS
A simplified time-independent parametric regression model fitted to an exponential
survival distribution using x16 as the only predictor was developed. The following output is from
R during analysis of the data set using the phreg function in R. The predictors are as defined in
Table 1. This utilized data set “g41r” which represents the final data set reduced by the removal
of units that lacked run-hour chronometers. Time at start (T2s), was used to represent time at the
start of the observation period and was set as T2s = 0 for all observations. T2ey represents time (in
years) accumulated during each observation period as T2ey = (Tfv - Tsv)/365.
The p = 0.94 value calculated for the fixed shape exponential distribution by phreg
appears to be in error as phreg is comparing the log likelihood to a test statistic of 0. The p-value
calculated for the unrestricted Weibull distribution returns a shape nearly identical to the
exponential function but a statistically significant value of p = 0.022. As the predictor β16 value
(0.207 and 0.208 respectively), shape (1 and 0.962 respectively) and log likelihood values
(-234.98 and -234.91 respectively) for these two functions are nearly identical, the p-value for
the exponential model should also be very close to p = 0.022.
The plots of these functions are shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12 in the Chapter IV.

> fit.x16.c <- coxreg(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r)
> fit.x16.c
Call:
coxreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r)
Covariate
x16

Mean
6.273

Events
Total time at risk
Max. log. likelihood
LR test statistic
Degrees of freedom
Overall p-value

Coef
0.199
58
1281.3
-279.75
4.57
1
0.0325215

Rel.Risk
1.220

S.E.
0.115

Wald p
0.084
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> fit.x16.e <- phreg(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r, dist="weibull",
shape=1)
> fit.x16.e
Call:
phreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r, dist = "weibull",
shape = 1)
Covariate
x16

W.mean
6.273

log(scale)
Shape is fixed at

Coef Exp(Coef)
0.207
1.230
4.456

86.165

se(Coef)
0.115

Wald p
0.072

0.792

0.000

1

Events
Total time at risk
Max. log. likelihood
LR test statistic
Degrees of freedom
Overall p-value

58
1281.3
-234.98
0
1
0.945997

> fit.x16.w <- phreg(Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r, dist="weibull")
> fit.x16.w
Call:
phreg(formula = Surv(T2s, T2ey, Fov) ~ x16, data = g41r, dist = "weibull")
Covariate
x16

W.mean
6.273

log(scale)
log(shape)
Events
Total time at risk
Max. log. likelihood
LR test statistic
Degrees of freedom
Overall p-value

Coef Exp(Coef)
0.208
1.232
4.576
-0.040

97.116
0.961

se(Coef)
0.115

Wald p
0.070

0.891
0.109

0.000
0.717

58
1281.3
-234.91
5.17
1
0.0229996

Using this model with the spreadsheet regression method returns the following:
For x16 ≤ 1, Rdata = 0.98353, Rmodel = 0.98739
For x16 = 7, Rdata = 0.95305, Rmodel = 0.95434
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APPENDIX C
RELIABILITY TABLES
Tables are provided for reliability based upon the model in Equation 18. Table 10 reflects
typical values assuming an average of 31.2 hours annual run time, the average for the sample
population in this study. Table 11 reflects units an average 100 hours annual run time. Generator
sets receiving weekly no-load tests and bimonthly or quarterly maintenance visits are represented
by the average intensity column. Generator sets receiving NFPA 110 (2016) recommended
maintenance are represented by the high intensity column. Units well exceeding NFPA 110
(2016) recommendations are represented by the extremely high intensity column. Reliability for
specific generator set age, run hours, and maintenance intensity can be calculated using Equation
18. Values of 0.08333, 1, and 7 were used respectively for average, high, and extremely high
maintenance intensity.

ℎ(𝑡) = 0.00696𝑒 0.240(𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)−1.476 log(𝐴𝑔𝑒)+.700 log(𝑅𝑢𝑛𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠)

(18)

Table 10. Emergency Diesel-Electric Generator Set Typical Reliability Table for 31.2 Annual
Run Hours
Maintenance Intensity

Age
0<t≤5
5 < t ≤ 10
10 < t ≤ 15
15 < t ≤ 20
20 < t ≤ 25
25 < t ≤ 30
30 < t ≤ 35
35 < t ≤ 40

Extremely
High
0.985201
0.989952
0.991500
0.992390
0.992995
0.993445
0.993798
0.994085

High
0.981593
0.987493
0.989419
0.990525
0.991278
0.991837
0.992277
0.992635

Average
0.924670
0.948271
0.956098
0.960616
0.963701
0.965998
0.967805
0.969280
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Table 11. Emergency Diesel-Electric Generator Set Typical Reliability Table for 100 Annual
Run Hours
Maintenance Intensity

Age
0<t≤5
5 < t ≤ 10
10 < t ≤ 15
15 < t ≤ 20
20 < t ≤ 25
25 < t ≤ 30
30 < t ≤ 35
35 < t ≤ 40

Extremely
High
0.978981
0.985712
0.987910
0.989173
0.990033
0.990672
0.991173
0.991582

High
0.973879
0.982227
0.984958
0.986527
0.987595
0.988389
0.989013
0.989522

Average
0.894474
0.927113
0.938033
0.944356
0.948679
0.951904
0.954441
0.956514
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APPENDIX D
NFPA 110 (2016) RECOMMENDATIONS

NFPA110 (2013) Maintenance Frequency

Check alarms
Check switch & breaker positions
Visual inspection for leaking fluids
Visual inspection of hoses, cables, etc.
Check fuel level
Check oil level
Check coolant level
Check air filter
Battery voltage & physical condition
Check fan belt(s)
Battery resistance or impedance test
Clean unit exterior (including radiator & louvers)
Fuel cleaning (or fluid analysis)
Oil change (or fluid analysis)
Check electrical tightness
Engine intensive maintenance
Generator (electrical) intensive maintenance

Unknown
N/A
Not Routine
More than 3 year
3 year
2 year
Annual
6-month
Quarterly
Monthly
Biweekly
Weekly
Daily
40hr/week watch
24/7 watch

ROUTINE PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

NFPA110 (2013) Test Frequency

Generator set no-load test
Generator set load test on load bank
Generator set load test on operational load
"Dead bus" operational load test

Unknown
N/A
Not routine
More than 3 year
3 year
2 year
Annual
6-month
3-month
Monthly
Biweekly
Weekly
Daily
40hr/week watch
24/7 watch

ROUTINE TESTING

X
X
X
X
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